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Abstract
This paper explores how sports were used by totalitarian regimes to achieve the goals of
the state. The three case studies involve the totalitarian governments of interwar Europe:
Italian Fascism, German Nazism, and Spanish Francoism. Three main trends were
identified. Sports were used to improve their nation’s health and fitness for military
preparation, construct a national identity, and as a diplomatic tool to improve their
international reputation. I also explore what ideological themes lent themselves to
construction of these three specific goals.
Keywords: totalitarianism, Western Europe, sports, regime, Nazism, fascism, Francoism
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I.

Introduction

On October 7, 2021, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) purchased a
controlling stake in English Premier League Football Club Newcastle United for $408
million. The takeover makes Newcastle the wealthiest club in England, if not the world.
PIF is “essentially a state savings account for the Saudi Arabian government,” and is
chaired by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salmand.1 The announcement of the
takeover on the fateful Thursday resulted in Twitter being spammed with Saudi
government-controlled disinformation accounts pumping out tweets, one of which reads:
“Whoever loves MBS [Mohammed bin Salman] supports Newcastle.” 2
A deal to sell the club to PIF was first agreed to in April the year prior, but was
stopped by the organizing body of the Premier League due to an issue during the “fit and
proper test” – a director's test aimed to prevent corrupt or untrustworthy people from
taking control of English football clubs. Doubts arose regarding the independence of PIF
from the Saudi government, to which the fund responded with the claim that they were an
“autonomous and purely commercial investor.” 3
The Saudi crown prince then asked UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson to intervene
to “correct” the Premier League’s “wrong” decision that prevented the £300 million
takeover in order to protect UK-Saudi relations from being damaged. Johnson and his
1

Rick Kelsey, "Newcastle United Takeover: What Is PIF, the Main Owner of the Club?," BBC, October 10,
2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-58842557.
2
Iyad El-Baghdadi, "The Saudi-led Takeover of Newcastle United Is a Victory for Autocrats Everywhere,"
The Washington Post, October 14, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/10/14/newcastle-united-takeover-mbs-saudi-arabia-wealth
-fund/.
3
Patrick Wintour, "Saudi Crown Prince Asked Boris Johnson to Intervene in Newcastle United Bid," The
Guardian, April 15, 2021,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/15/saudis-asked-boris-johnson-to-intervene-in-newcastle-unit
ed-bid.
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ministers showed public sympathy for PIF and their rejected bid and the Foreign Office
held meetings with the Premier League to discuss it, but the government does not hold
the direct power to overrule the Premier League decision. Upon the completion of the
deal months later, the government denied any official involvement in the change of
decision by the Premier League and refused to provide details about discussions between
Saudi Arabia, the UK, and League officials because it could "harm" relations with Saudi
Arabia.4
The successful takeover of the club came just five days after the three year
anniversary of the political assassination of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Ahmad
Khashoggi. The chair of PIF, bin Salman, was named as the man who approved the
operation, according to US intelligence reports, and private jets owned by PIF were used
in the assassination.5

6

During the investigation of the assassination, the Newcastle

Central member of Parliament, Chi Onwurah, called on the UK government to
acknowledge that Mohammed bin Salman was “the autocratic ruler of what is now shown
to be a murderous state.” Three years later, MP Onwurah celebrated Newcastle fans for
their “persistence & determination” in getting the Premier League to overturn their
original rejection of the bid from that very same “autocratic ruler” of a “murderous
state”.7
4

Colin George and Kate Whannel, "Newcastle United: UK Blocks Details of Premier League Talks to
Protect Saudi Relations," BBC, October 8, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-58840820.
5
Hannah Ryan, "Their Club Became the Richest in the World. But These Fans Are Worried at What It
Means for Newcastle's Soul," CNN, November 27, 2021,
https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/09/football/newcastle-united-fans-against-saudi-ownership-spt-intl-cmd/inde
x.html.
6
El-Baghdadi, "The Saudi-led."
7
Chi Onwurah (@ChiOnwurah), "Not commenting on #nufctakeover until confirmed – too many false
starts in the past – but any u-turn by the @premierleague is due to the persistence & determination of #nufc
fans to expose their anti-competitive & unaccountable behaviour, rather than changes in media rights!,"
Twitter, October 7, 2021, 2:25 a.m., https://twitter.com/ChiOnwurah/status/1446044116295589893.
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While Newcastle fans were overjoyed with the potential of billions of dollars of
investments into their poorly performing club, human rights groups around the world
called upon the UK government and the Premier League to adopt stricter regulations to
prevent corrupt and controversial figures from owning sports clubs to prevent regimes
from sportswashing. Sportswashing is a term that has become popular in the past two
decades, and describes when a regime or actor on behalf of a state, usually with a poor
human rights record, uses sport to improve their image.8 While actors on the highest level
of the international stage, such as Mohammad bin Salman, have been accused of
sportswashing, the pandering on the local level, as seen in the case of MP Onwurah, can
also be seen as a form of sportswashing.The Saudi government, in fact, has been accused
of spending upwards of $1.5 billion dollars of sportswashing, including staging the
annual Spanish Supercopa football match in Riyadh, building a brand new racetrack to
host Formula 1 races in Jeddah, hosting international men's and women's golf
tournaments, professional wrestling, and many others.9
This heavy investment in sportswashing raises questions about why politicians at
all levels of government and non-state actors have been increasingly tying themselves to
and investing in sports. By examining the political history of sports, we can gain a better
understanding of this growing phenomenon. The political use of sports is not new by any
means. Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations pushed political and ideological beliefs
through sporting events that celebrated the human body and physical culture. However,
the political exploitation of modern sports and the cultural and economic benefits of a
8

HJ Mai, "Saudi Arabia and China Are Accused of Using Sports to Cover up Human Rights Abuse," NPR,
December 2, 2021,
https://www.npr.org/2021/11/29/1058048696/saudi-arabia-formula-1-china-olympics-human-rights-sports.
9
Mai, "Saudi Arabia."
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nation’s participation in them as we understand it nowadays developed over the course of
the past century.10 Associative modern sports in Europe followed the industrial revolution
and Enlightenment period with the creation of a bourgeois public sphere. The
mid-eighteenth century saw the creation of sports such as cricket, golf and horse racing,
which would give way to later modern sports such as baseball, European football
(hereinafter football), basketball, and tennis.11 The popularization, internationalization,
and commercialization of sports would follow the foundation of the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA), founded in 1894 and 1904 respectively.12 The strategic manipulation of modern
sport for the political goals of the state would quickly follow with the rise of
totalitarianism in Europe.
Totalitarian ideologies, specifically fascism – a right-wing totalitarian ideology,
came about in Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century. Political theorist Franz
Borkenau posited that totalitarianism grew “as a response to structural conflicts and crises
of the modern world, and as a result of historical processes which brought specific
societies and traditions face to face with the modern predicament.”

13

Following major

social, political, and economic shifts due to industrialization, the rise of individualism
from the Enlightenment, and the fall of colonial powers resulted in the atomization of
society which is “the tendency for society to be made up of a collection of self-interested
10

Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young, "Culture, Politics, and Spectacle in the Global Sports
Event—An Introduction," in National Identity and Global Sports Events: Culture, Politics, and Spectacle
in the Olympics and the Football World Cup (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), 1.
11
Stefan Szymanski, "A Theory of the Evolution of Modern Sport," Journal of Sport History 35, no. 1
(Spring 2008): 2, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26404949.
12
Tomlinson and Young, "Culture, Politics," 1.
13
Vassil Girginov, "Totalitarian Sport: Towards an Understanding of its Logic, Practice and Legacy,"
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 5, no. 1 (2004): 30,
https://doi.org/10.1080/1469076042000223392.

9

and largely self-sufficient individuals, operating as separate atoms.”

14

This atomization

of society, as explained by Hannah Arendt, contributed to a significant loss of tradition,
particularly of the “Roman trinity of authority, tradition and religion.”

15

Totalitarianism

offered a solution to this “crisis of modernity” with an “escape into wholeness,” which
promised happiness, a harmonious life, and plenitude for everyone in a new society based
on traditional ideas in opposition to the nineteenth century’s positivism and liberalism.16
Italian historian Emilio Gentile described totalitarianism as:
an experiment in political domination undertaken by a revolutionary movement,
with an integralist conception of politics, that aspires toward a monopoly of
power and that, after having secured power, whether by legal or illegal means,
destroys or transforms the previous regime and constructs a new State based on a
single-party regime, with the chief objective of conquering society; that is, it
seeks the subordination, integration and homogenisation of the governed on the
basis of the integral politicisation of existence, whether collective or individual,
interpreted according to the categories, myths and values of a palingenetic
ideology, institutionalised in the form of a political religion, that aims to shape the
individual and the masses through an anthropological revolution in order to
regenerate the human being and create the new man, who is dedicated in body and
soul to the realisation of the revolutionary and imperialistic policies of the
totalitarian party, whose ultimate goal is to create a new civilisation beyond the
NationState.17

14

Andrew Heywood, Global Politics (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2011), 138.
Ulrike Ehret, "Understanding the Popular Appeal of Fascism, National Socialism and Soviet
Communism: The Revival of Totalitarianism Theory and Political Religion," History Compass 5, no. 4
(2007): 1238, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2007.00438.x.
16
Ehret, "Understanding the Popular," 1238.
17
Emilio Gentile, "Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections on
Criticism of an Interpretation," Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 5, no. 3 (2004): 327,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1469076042000312177.
15
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Key elements of totalitarian ideology include a revolutionary party, a monopoly of power,
a political religion, a palingenetic worldview, an anthropological revolution, and
expansionist ambitions.
In order to support these elements, totalitarian regimes needed a united and
fanatical group of supporters. Totalitarian regimes sought to bring together all aspects of
society under strict organization and micro-organization to create one cohesive collective
identity. While historians for many years focused on the charisma of totalitarian leaders
or the structures of their society, historians in the 1960s began to focus on totalitarian
cultures. Although the success of totalitarianism relied heavily on demagogy,
opportunism, and terror, the regime also had to create a singular shared identity to appeal
to aspirations and desires of the collective.18 One compelling understanding of how
culture played a role in fascism is provided by Emile Gentile:
The fascist conception of life gave rise to fascist behaviour in the way of doing
politics, organising social existence, conceiving the overall objectives, not on the
basis of logic and persuasion, but by appealing to the instinct, to faith, feeling, and
imagination, to the magnetic attraction of the leader. The fascist group was
conceived as a group bound by the ties of the faith. A fascist did not choose or
discuss doctrine because he was primarily a believer and a fighter. Fascism
appeared an escape from all that gave substance and measure to social existence,
and hence deprived it of its Romantic, mystic, heroic, and adventurous dimension.
Adventure, heroism, the spirit of sacrifice, mass rituals, the cult of martyrs, the
ideals of war and sports, fanatical devotion to the leader – these were the
characteristics of fascist collective behaviour.19

18
19

Gentile, "Fascism, Totalitarianism," 333.
Gentile, "Fascism, Totalitarianism," 338.
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Thus, it was the regimes who could engage the masses through the manipulation and
adoption of a state-organized culture were able to succeed. As explained by George L.
Mosse, one of the leading theorists on totalitarian culture: “Economic well-being was
subordinate to the stress upon art, literature, indeed the total cultural endeavor. Fascism
was a revolution, but one which thought of itself in cultural, not economic terms.” 20
Sports were (and are) deeply intertwined with the cultural traditions of Europe
and had strong, distinct relationships with other aspects of society, such as
character-building, community-building, education, war, business, and the international
community.21 Therefore, as did all aspects of culture under fascism, sports came directly
under the control of the state. Under these fascist regimes, sport was not an end in itself,
but rather became a means to an end. Sports became a political instrument to achieve the
goals of the state.22
In this thesis, I will explore how Western European totalitarian regimes utilized
sport to support the goals of the state. German Nazism, Italian fascism, and Spanish
Francoism dramatically differed in their manifestations of totalitarianism, which includes
their national sports policies. Despite their unique and distinctive characteristics, the three
regimes utilized sports to achieve three major goals: improving their nation’s health and
fitness for military preparation, constructing a national identity, and as a diplomatic tool
to improve their international reputation. By analyzing these three recurrent themes
regarding the politicization of sport by totalitarian regimes, we can get a foundational
20

George L. Mosse, "Introduction: The Genesis of Fascism," Journal of Contemporary History 1, no. 1
(January 1966): 22, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200946600100103.
21
Girginov, "Totalitarian Sport," 25.
22
Raquel Mirabet and Xavier Pujadas, "Intellectuals and Warriors: The Ideological and Political Basis of
Francoist University Sport, 1933–1946," The International Journal of the History of Sport 35, no. 11
(2018): 1183, https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2019.1582523.
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understanding of the nature of sport as a political tool. Despite the over 3.5 million
viewers that tune in to watch major sporting events such as the World Cup, the study of
the influence of sport in the political context has gone largely unresearched.23 In fact,
across three premier political science journals, American Political Science Review,
American Journal of Political Science, or International Organization, not a single research
article has been published with the word “sport” in the title. Thus, the foundational
understanding of how regimes originally politicized sports can provide a basis and
grounding for future research in more modern cases of sportswashing.

23

"More than Half the World Watched Record-breaking 2018 World Cup," FIFA, last modified December
21, 2018,
https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/2018russia/media-releases/more-than-half-the-world-wa
tched-record-breaking-2018-world-cup.
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II.

Health and Military Preparation

As highlighted in Chapter One, totalitarian ideology includes elements of a
monopoly of power, a palingenetic worldview, and expansionist ambitions. These three
aspects of totalitarianism caused many regimes to militarize society in ways the world
had not seen before. In order for a violence-backed regime to achieve their promised
‘national rebirth’ and expansionist goals, the state had to invest heavily in improving their
national military.
As part of the palingenetic worldview, the state sought to “replace gerontocracy,
mediocrity and national weakness with youth, heroism and national greatness, to banish
anarchy and decadence and bring order and health.” 24 This manifested in the myth of the
‘new man’ characterized by traits of courage, discipline, and virility.25 In most regimes,
nationalist and racist qualities were also applied to this myth. In Germany, the ‘new man’
was embodied in the Nazi’s Aryan ubermensch; in Italy, the Italiano nuovo; and in Spain,
the soldier-monk. These utopic visions of the national stock relied on the improvement of
the overall health and fitness of the nation’s citizenry.26
Totalitarian regimes pursued territorial expansion for international prestige and
financial gain. As had been established by early colonial powers, colonial possessions
afforded governments economic privileges and international prestige as a so-called “great
power.” Since some of the most powerful empires, such as Britain and France, still held a
significant portion of their colonies at the time of the rise of totalitarianism, territorial
expansion became a sine qua non for international political ascendancy and domestic
24

Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 2006 ed. (London: Routledge, 2010), 39.
Girginov, "Totalitarian Sport," 45.
26
Girginov, 34.
25

14

legitimization.27 Additionally, since Germany, Spain, and Italy had been constructed by
the unification of distinct city-states or regions, territorial conquest was a valid, if not
celebrated, tool for state-building. Furthermore, economic crises in the late 19th century
gave rise to a wave of neomercantilism, which pushed the idea that economic growth
could not be created, but instead was achieved through territorial acquisition and high
exports.28
Italy and Germany, as relatively new states having been unified in the mid-19th
century, did not have the opportunity to participate as their modern nations in the era of
European colonization. Their unification under Piedmont and Prussia, respectively,
contributed to their belief that territorial acquisition was part of their national tradition.29
Furthermore, because Italy and Germany had lost land as part of their punishments after
World War I, both regimes identified the reconquering of former territories as crucial to
the restoration of their nation’s glory. All of these factors culminated in the practice of
irredentism and lebensraum, respectively.30 Spain, as a former colonial power, and Italy,
as the historical descendant of the great Roman empire, also aspired to re-establish their
imperial status as part of their nation rebirth.31
These totalitarian regimes' ambitions to become great imperial powers and create
nations of virile, young soldiers called for significant military investment. Physical
education and sports had widely been used as part of military training for both the
27

Aristotle A. Kallis, "Expansionism in Italy and Germany between Unification and the First World War:
On the Ideological and Political Origins of Fascist Expansionism," European History Quarterly 28, no. 4
(October 1998): 438, https://doi.org/10.1177/026569149802800401.
28
Kallis, "Expansionism in Italy," 439.
29
Kallis, 442.
30
Alan Cassels, "Was There a Fascist Foreign Policy? Tradition and Novelty," The International History
Review 5, no. 2 (May 1983): 256, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40105294.
31
Robert Gale Woolbert, "Spain as an African Power," Foreign Affairs 24, no. 4 (July 1946): 724,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20030007.
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psychological and athletic benefits. Physical education programs began to be introduced
in schools around the world throughout the 19th century for the improvement of the
health and fitness of society, but failed to be implemented widely.32 Sports, in the
western, democratic countries, remained on the periphery of commercial culture, and
were confined to the bourgeois class for both participation and spectatorship. In contrast,
outside of the western world, sports became regulated by the state, making access to
sports much easier.33 It was not until the fascist regimes of the 1920s and ‘30s that the
mobilizing capacity of sport and physical education was extensively invested in as a
means of improving national health and providing military preparation for the masses.

Italy
Mussolini’s faith in sport as a tool for general public fitness and pre-military
training can be traced back to the Futurist movement in early twentieth century Italy.
Futurism was an artistic and political movement that advocated for revolutionary and
non-conformist ideas surrounding youth, speed, and technology. Futurists heavily focused
on the strength of the youth, a culture of the body, and encouraged the discipline that
came along with physical fitness and sport. In their Programma Politico Futurista
(Futurist Political Programme), which examined the educational system, they called for
the introduction of daily gymnastics programs at schools and the increased training of
physical education teachers.34 This strength was crucial for the colonial wars that
Futurists believed were necessary and inevitable: “We will glorify war—the world’s only
32

Timothy P. O'Hanlon, "School Sports as Social Training: The Case of Athletics and the Crisis of World
War I," Journal of Sport History 9, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/43611462.
33
Szymanski, "A Theory," 3.
34
Gigliola Gori, "Supermanism and Culture of the Body in Italy: The Case of Futurism," The International
Journal of the History of Sport 16, no. 1: 160, https://doi.org/10.1080/09523369908714061.
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hygiene—militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful
ideas worth dying for.” 35
One of the founders of the Futurist movement Filippo Tommaso Marinetto
identified the merits of sports as preparing the youth for both the mental and physical
aspects of military service. As a cyclist himself, Marnetti served in World War One as a
volunteer in the Corpo Nazionale Volontari Ciclisti Automobilisti (National Corps of
Volunteer Cyclists and Motorists), which promoted cycling for the development of team
spirit and discipline that would facilitate joining the army.36 Cycling, along with certain
other sports such as boxing and gymnastics, as opposed to the increasingly popular
football, facilitated the physical culture necessary for a war-focused society.

37

Italian

magazine La Gazzetta dello Sport also identified track and field as important to military
training in their comparison between javelin throwing and grenade throwing:
Throwing a hand grenade randomly in an enemy area is like sowing coriander or
confetti on ungrateful terrain, nobody is hit and no jams are born. The effective
and precise gesture of the launch has been taught […] by sports training […].
Now that the hand grenade is so powerful a means of the coming offense and of
the immediate attack—in which everything depends on the visual and athletic
qualities of the pitcher—it is still and always the school of sport that takes care of
providing the Army with the best and more numerous champions. 38
After difficult and arguably unsuccessful negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference and
serious post-war economic problems, Italians sought a new government that would lift
35

Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism, trans. R. W. Flint (New York:
Viking Press, 1973),
https://archive.compart.uni-bremen.de/2014/website/fileadmin/media/lernen/Futurist_Manifesto.pdf.
36
Francesca Gatta, "Sports and the Military in Italian Newspapers from the First World War," in Italy and
the Military: Cultural Perspectives from Unification to Contemporary Italy, ed. Mattia Roveri
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 80, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57161-0.
37
Simon Martin, Football and Fascism: The National Game under Mussolini (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 27.
38
Gatta, "Sports and the Military," 86.
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them from their crises. Marinetti’s Partito Politico Futurista merged with Benito
Mussolini’s Fasci Italiani di Combattimento, and he wrote the original Fascist Manifesto
in 1919.39 Though he would leave politics just a year later, Marinetti’s influence over the
importance of sport to Italy’s fascist regime is undeniable.
Utilizing the values propagated by Futurists, Mussolini sought to address what he
believed to be one of the most pressing issues facing Italian society upon his rise to
power. World War One brought to light the terrible health and fitness conditions of Italian
people. Especially amongst the lower and working classes, mass conscription revealed
how poor living conditions and diets had taken a toll on the men of Italy. There was
widespread illness, such as heart problems, rickets, mental illness, and skin diseases,
many of which were worsened by congenital defects.40 Considering that many of
healthiest and fittest Italians were killed in World War One and another 600,000 were
killed during the 1918 Spanish Flu, when Mussolini came to power, he had great
concerns about the national stock, the impact that would have on future military
endeavors, and the general international perception of the Italian people.41
Furthermore, a series of abject athletic performances preceded the nation’s poor
military performance during World War One. Thus, popular belief suggested that stronger
athletic performances would lead to better performance during war.42 The Partito
Nazionale Fascista party secretary Augusto Turati identified sporting success,
specifically on an international level, as directly tied to future military success:

39

Marinetti, The Founding.
Patrizia Dogliani, "Sport and Fascism," Journal of Modern Italian Studies 5, no. 3 (2000): 326,
https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2000.9728258.
41
Martin, Football and Fascism, 39.
42
Martin, 30.
40
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In some years, when the legions of young that will have been able to train in all of
our cities and regions have reached physical maturity, Italy will be able to count
on a mass of wisely prepared athletes that, in international competitions, will hoist
the tricolour up the flagstaff of the Olympic Stadium; and it will have an army of
men in which desire and courage will equal military force and virtue.43
Moreover, Mussolini quickly established that fascist governments were best suited to
protect the health and well-being of its people. During his 1927 Ascension Day address,
Mussolini claimed that, “in a well ordered State, the care of the physical health of the
people must occupy first place.” This would be dramatically different than the “suicidal
theory” of laissez-faire, liberal governments’ belief in “let well alone.”44 Thus, Mussolini
put forth that the fascist party sought to restore the health and well-being of the Italian
people. Influenced by the aforementioned Futurists, the regime looked towards mass
participation in sports and physical education to achieve this goal.
Equally as important as the general fitness of the Italian population in case of
mass conscription was the restoration of former glory of the Roman Empire and the
image of ‘Latin athleticism.’ Mussolini was interested in the creation of an Italian war
state, populated by citizen-soldiers that were physically and mentally prepared to fight.
Sport was meant to create not just physically stronger Italians, but also to reinstill their
former virility and aggression, thus creating the Italiano nuovo.45 The regime’s offensive
military goal meant that the propaganda of sport was mainly pushed towards Italian
males, rather than females.
43

Martin, Football and Fascism, 48.
The New York Times Company, "Full Text of Mussolini's Speech Outlining His Plans for a Greater
Italy," The New York Times, May 29, 1927,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1927/05/29/106926131.html.
45
Sarah Morgan, "Mussolini's Boys (and Girls) Gender and Sport in Fascist Italy," History Australia 3, no.
1 (2006): 2, https://doi.org/10.2104/ha060004.
44
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In order to strengthen the physique and character of young men, three main
governmental sporting organizations were created: the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro
(OND), the Opera Naionale Balilla (ONB), and the Comitato Olimpica Nazionale
Italiano (CONI). The organizations dealt with different aspects of sport: the OND and
ONB both developed mass participation in sports for adults and youths, respectively,
while CONI focused on professional competition. The OND operated under the slogan:
“Many participants and few spectators,'' emphasizing the importance of engaging as
many people as possible, instead of "seeking champions or grooming exceptional athletes
to break records." 46 The goal of the OND was explicit:
To teach the working masses in a practical way that, with relatively little effort,
they can better their physical condition, strengthen and reinvigorate themselves,
build up their resistance to diseases and, finally, ready themselves for the fatigue
of work, and if necessary, that of war.47
In conjunction with the ONB, the Italian government became the first European state to
create a centralized and comprehensive athletic program in schools. Previously, physical
education had been taught in just a handful of military and civil institutes in gyms.
Mussolini’s Minister of Education Giovanni Gentile consolidated these under the
National Institute for Physical Education in 1923.48 Physical education shifted from
training regimens to open-air team sports. Physical education teachers switched from
army officers to trained athletes. All students had to take physical education classes and
could not attend school unless they were officially members of an authorized sports

46

Victoria De Grazia, The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 173.
47
De Grazia, The Culture, 173.
48
Dogliani, "Sport and Fascism," 328.
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club.49 Beyond school, sporting societies grew dramatically under Fascist control.
Football clubs grew from 1,040 in 1922 to 2,539 in 1939, while their membership
increased from 15,420 to 50,455.50 This new structure was meant to create a larger
sporting culture and instill a sense of camaraderie and discipline amongst the youth.
The promotion of team sports, specifically, was short-lived. By the mid 1930s, as
Italy prepared to invade Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War broke out, and World War Two
was on the horizon, the national sports agenda shifted towards sports that would provide
skills necessary for war. This included combat sports, such as wrestling and boxing, as
well as riflery and musket shooting.51 The most significant development was the
introduction of women in these more militarized sports. Prior to the mid-‘30s, much of
the rhetoric surrounding women’s sports focused on improving their health in preparation
for maternity and birthing young soldiers. Therefore, the sports they partook in, such as
gymnastics, were meant to emphasize elegance and femininity.52 For example, a 1928
target-shooting competition for young women hosted by the ONB was heavily criticized
by both the sporting world and society at large. The Pope even wrote a letter condemning
the event.53 Opinions on women’s involvement in more aggressive sports changed as war
became imminent. The militaristic elements of mens sports, such as choreographed
goose-stepping and uniforms, were adopted by women’s sporting society. By 1939,
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almost all women's groups were preparing for war and the regime began calling on them
to support troops in Spain.54

Germany
Germans had a long history of participation in fitness and exercise. Throughout
the 19th century, Germans took part in Turnvereine, which were gymnastic and fitness
clubs around the country that celebrated German culture and liberal politics. By the
beginning of 1914, the Duetsche Turnerschaft (DT) was the largest physical exercise
organization in the world and boasted over 1.4 million paying members in Germany.
Turnen had been espoused by its founder F.L. Jahn for its benefit of military preparedness
and the strengthening of the Germanic race.55 Thus, as World War One began, many
Turnen members left to fight in the trenches.
Following their failure in World War One, Germany sought to improve their
military capabilities. It appeared as though British military preparations for the war had
been more successful, and the Germans had identified their heavy participation in sports
as part of their key to success.56 This decision would result in moving away from Turnen
to begin the ‘sportification’ of Germany that would precede their entrance to World War
Two. During the Weimar Republic, despite attempts to increase sports involvement
among society, little was successfully completed.57 Germany was in the unique position,
in comparison to Spain and Italy, that they had lost the military privileges in the Treaty of
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Versailles. This meant, previous compulsory training had to be stopped, and sports were
elected to replace it. In 1921, daily physical education lessons were introduced into
school, but poor economic conditions and a lack of governmental coordination meant that
these lessons were never fully implemented.58
The Nazis, however, would be able to implememnt the sports policies that the
Weimar Regime never had the strength or funds to complete. Hitler had long advocated
on behalf of a sport for the creation of young soldiers. In his 1924 manifesto Mein Kampf,
Hitler writes:
Not a single day should be allowed to pass in which the young pupil does not
have one hour of physical training in the morning and one in the evening; and
every kind of sport and gymnastics should be included. There is one kind of sport
which should be specially encouraged, although many people who call themselves
Völkisch consider it brutal and vulgar, and that is boxing [...] There is no other
sport which equals this in developing the militant spirit, none that demands such a
power of rapid decision or which gives the body the flexibility of good steel. [...]
Generally speaking, the function of sport is not only to make the individual
strong, alert and daring, but also to harden the body and train it to endure an
adverse environment.59
Physical fitness, according to the Nazi Party, was crucial in forming a “hygenic Aryan
race” with the “mentality of a soldier.”60 Athletic ability in ‘combat’ sports, such as
football, handball, and boxing, were highly praised for demonstrating the supreme
‘strength’ and ‘vigor’ of the Germanic race. While sporting success was important, the
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more heavily celebrated traits were a disregard for personal injury and a willingness to
commit to the team.61
When the Nazi party came to power in 1933, they prioritized the school and club
sports systems. Many people involved in sport prior to World War One volunteered to be
soldiers.62 Following their return home, they became disenfranchised with the liberal
goals of the Weimar Republic and found comraderie under the Nazi values. The Nazi
Party praised the courage and strength they displayed on the front lines and promised
them higher status within the party structure.63 Therefore, in the years leading up to the
Nazi’s seizure of power, members of the Nazi Party began taking high positions of power
within German club and school sports during the Weimar Republic, such as Dr. Carl
Krümmel who was elected president of the German Organization of Physical Educators
in 1925. Many of these positions were able to easily transition under the Third Reich.
This made the improvement of the physical education and sporting systems a preeminent
concern for the Third Reich when they took control.
Hans von Tschammer und Osten, a former soldier and colonel of a paramilitary
group, was named Reichssportführer (Reich Sports Leader) just months after the Nazi’s
seizure of power. He hoped to ensure mass participation in sport as it was “an
indispensable condition for the education of youth for military readiness.”64 Under his
control along with the aforementioned Krümmel, physical education became the most
important subject in school. The Weimar Republic’s promise of daily physical education
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lessons was fully funded and implemented by the Nazis. Physical education became
mandatory and a general fitness certificate became a prerequisite for graduation and
going to university. By 1937, physical education was allocated five hours of lesson time
per week and those who failed it were not permitted to continue their studies.65 Nazi
authorities sought to train young Germans through organizations like Hitler Youth and
other paramilitary organizations. The Hitler Youth brought all youth sporting clubs under
their control to ensure both the proper physical development and the mental
indoctrination needed to create soldiers.66
Sports clubs for adults followed similar requirements for physical and mental
preparation as the Hitler Youth. Sport clubs were required by law to offer military and
paramilitary defense and attack sports which were considered as developing
characteristics necessary for war.67 Sports such as mountain climbing and alpine skiing
were also encouraged to recruit soldiers for mountain divisions in the military.68 Members
of the sports club had to first fulfill military preparation requirements prior to
participating in normal sports activities. If at least one year of military training was not
completed, athletes could not participate in championship competitions for their sport.
Military training included philosophical indoctrination in Nazi ideology.69
Sports leaders saw the start of World War Two as the ultimate test of their
physical education: “This struggle is at the same time the test of the national-socialist
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education. It will be a proof of character of the first order. Who could know in advance
that our political physical education could show its quality so soon?”

70

Shortly after the

war began, Germany’s physical education declined rapidly because many teachers and
educators were fighting on the front lines. In most cities, physical education classes were
closed after two years of war and many sports facilities were destroyed by Allied
attacks.71

Spain
Despite coming to power over five years after Hitler and over fifteen years after
Mussolini, the roots of fascism in Spain trace back long before Franco’s rise to power.
The Falange, Franco’s fascist political party, was composed of four main ideologies: the
monarchical conservatism, authoritarian Catholicism, radical national syndicalism, and
the regenerationism of José Antonio Primo de Rivera.72 The last of these,
regenerationism, provided the most insight into the purpose and potential of sport in early
20th century Spain.
The shame and dishonor stemming from Spain’s 1898 defeat during the
Spanish-American War spurred a search to cure the country’s ‘national asphyxia’ to
which the defeat was attributed. Regenerationism was an intellectual movement that
sought to find scientific and objective causes for Spain's decline and find solutions.
Regenerationists offered sport as a cure to the nation’s perceived weaknesses. Sport, they
believed, would help restore their masculine, imperial vigor through hyper aggression
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and strength. Sports provided space to construct a national identity of virility and physical
superiority, as well as shape morals necessary for a nation’s military survival, such as
courage and sacrifice.73 Regenerationists argued that:
For a nation to flourish, it is necessary to have men, but it is necessary to make
those men, and they will be best found in sports centres where each one
physically educates himself, strengthens his muscles and develops his
understanding, in the sport which he prefers.74
Football, specifically, stood out as the sport that would help achieve regenerationists’
goals as a hyper aggressive, team sport. Out of this movement, some of Spain’s most
important football clubs, including Fútbol Club Barcelona, Athletic de Bilbao, Real
Madrid Club de Fútbol, and Atlético de Madrid, would arise.75 In addition to the growth
of football, military sport organizations opened to allow mass access to fitness and sport.
In 1919, the Army Gymnastics School opened in Toledo. This institution, and institutions
similar to it, served the explicit purpose of improving the fitness of current soldiers as
well as developing new generations of soldiers.76
Spain’s first dictator, Miguel Primo de Rivera, emerged from the regenerationist
movement. He was viewed by regenerationists as the “iron surgeon” who would cure
Spain of all their ills.77 Primo de Rivera adopted regenerationism’s physical education
proposal. In 1924, a Royal Order tasked delegados gubernativos (government delegates)
73

Mariann Vaczi, "'The Spanish Fury': A Political Geography of Soccer in Spain," International Review for
the Sociology of Sport 50, no. 2 (2015): 201, https://doi.org/10.1177/1012690213478940.
74
Teresa Gonzalez Aja, "Spanish Sports Policy in Republican and Fascist Spain," in Sport and
International Politics: Impact of Facism and Communism on Sport, ed. Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan
(London: Taylor and Francis, 1998), 102.
75
Aja, "Fascists and Christians!," 103.
76
Aja, 99.
77
Antonio S. Almeida Aguiar, "Regenerationism, Physical Education and Sport as Symbols of Modernity
in the Canary Islands, 1898–1930," The International Journal of the History of Sport, 2020,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2020.1729747.

27

to distribute newly created “gymnastic record books” to everyone in their district so they
could track their daily physical activity.78 A year later, compulsory gymnastics for all
students between age six to eighteen was introduced to schools with “biometric cards” to
track their progress. The National Physical Culture Committee also encouraged
participation in gymnastics and shooting sports.79
Despite the ambitious proposals Primo de Rivera offered during his reign, their
execution would fall short. Most of the delegados gubernativos never received the
gymnastics record books and, therefore, never distributed them to their districts.80 Many
of the poorer regions of Spain lacked the resources to introduce compulsory physical
education in schools. Infrastructure projects meant to create gyms and sporting grounds
were never funded by the regime.81 Ultimately, in comparison to Mussolini’s physical
education plans, the failure to commit funds to these public expenditures resulted in the
regime's inability to fully engage Spanish citizens in a sporting culture. Primo de Rivera
eventually lost the support of the military and was forced to step down.
In the wake of Primo de Rivera’s departure, a republican government was
established. While the left-leaning republicans and socialists were able to take the
majority in Parliament, right-leaning activists were not dissuaded by the failures of the
former dictator. In 1931, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and Onesimo Redondo Ortega formed
the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (National Syndicalist Offensive Juntas,
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JONS), a nationalist and syndicalist organization, comprised of workers and students.82
Redondo had studied in Germany and had taken part in the creation of the German
Nationalsozialistischer

Deutscher

Studentenbund

(National-Socialist

Student

Association, NSDStB). Ramos founded a Spanish version of the Italian fascist magazine
La Conquista dello Stato called La Conquista del Estado, in which he propagated fascism
and fought against the republican government.83 From their respective fascist influences,
they recognized the importance of an established fascist party, rather than the less
organized military-backed dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Thus, they created JONS,
which would be the first official political organization in Spain with the national
syndicalist label.84 In 1933, Miguel Primo de Rivera’s son, José Antonio Primo de Rivera
founded the Falange Española, another nationalist and fascist political party. The Falange
and JONS would merge in 1934 due to their common political goals.85 Having previously
worked with the NSDStB, Redondo advocated for a revolutionary nationalist youth
organization that was prepared for violence: “Youth should take exercise in physical
struggle, should love violence as a matter of course. National violence is just, is
necessary, is convenient. One of our permanent watchwords is that of cultivating the
spirit of violence, of military conflict.”
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Thus, the Falange advocated for the

incorporation of sports into Spanish society, predominantly through the introduction of
physical education at schools for the preparation for military conflicts.
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Since JONS had started as an organization predominantly made up of students
and intellectuals, there was a close link between the Falange and higher education
institutions. The Sindicato Espanol Universitario (SEU) was a student union that formed
under the Falange in opposition to the republican Federacion Universitaria Escolar
(FUE).87 During the Second National Council of the SEU in 1935, the Falange laid out its
primary political initiatives, which included education reform. Jose Antonio Primo de
Rivera sought to establish sports as mandatory in the universities in order as part of a
student’s service to the nation.88 Considering the proximity to the outbreak of civil war, it
is clear that the use of physical education was a tool to aid the Falange in achieving its
goals. The SEU would affirm its prerogatives with regard to university sport after the war
in their magazine:
The Falangist mindset does not conceive of hunched over and near-sighted
intellectual, who does not know how to hold a rifle or how to overcome with his
heart the obstacles that can appear. To avoid this, our task has been arduous. First
of all, we had to create what didn’t already exist: a sporting organization with
broad, national objectives. Having obtained this, we base our mission at
University on preparing and physically developing students for the best service to
the Nation. As sport is not a purpose by itself, it was necessary to use it in the true
Spanish sense and give it the great importance it really has. For us, sport is
another weapon ready to serve Spain, and its practice is as necessary as the
existence of Falange. 89
In 1939, Francisco Franco and the Falange successfully overthrew the Second
Republic. The transition from a democratic republic to fascism was all encompassing,
and sports were no exception. Influenced by his regenerationist and Falangist
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predecessors, Franco recognized the importance of sport in improving the health and
fitness of Spaniards. Following decades of war, political instability, and economic
downturn, Franco sought to reestablish the image of the Spanish people. The idea Franco
specifically desired for his Catholic fascist society was the ‘soldier-monk’. The
‘soldier-monk’ image was meant to embody the perfect gentleman, willing to sacrifice
themselves for their country, while maintaining a deep faith.90 Sport and physical activity
would shape the fitness and values of the younger generation, to prepare them to become
the ‘soldier-monk’. Through sport organizations and physical education programs created
by the Falange, the government sought to attract and recruit young men into the party
The primary organization through which young Spaniards received their physical
education was the Frente de Juventudes (Youth Front, FJ). The creation of youth
organizations was learned from Spain’s fascist neighbors and had been a practice of the
Falange even before they took control of the government. During the civil war, the
Falange Youth Organization and the SEU received paramilitary training and physical
preparation to fight for the Nationalists.91 Once Franco took power, he established a
formal party organization similar to that of the Hitler Youth or the Opera Nazionale
Balilla. These organizations would provide physical education and sport in accordance
with the changing needs of the regime
The Falange officially established the FJ in December of 1940. The establishing
law clearly establishes the primary directive of the institution: “Esa unidad de las
juventudes al servicio del Movimiento, debe tener una de sus más relevantes expresiones,
90
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España, 1870-2010, by Xavier Pujadas i Martí (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2011), [Page #].
91

31

en la estrecha colaboración del Frente de Juventudes con la Milicia del Partido para las
tareas de instrucción premilitar.” (“This youth unit at the service of the Movement must
have one of its most relevant expressions in the close collaboration of the Frente de
Juventudes with the Militia of the Party for the tasks of pre-military instruction.”)92
Though also contributing to the “espíritu católico [y] español” (“Catholic and
Spanish spirit”) of their members, the actual education the FJ provided was primarily
physical.93 The FJ offered physical education in schools as well as at camps, which
students were required to attend. The training at these camps mirrored military training,
in order to ensure the youth were capable of enduring combat. The camps usually lasted
twenty days and took place at military-like barracks. The days consisted of gymnastics,
marching, and various sports competitions, namely basketball, volleyball, fencing, and
track and field.94 The FJ also hosted sports competitions in schools beginning in 1949, as
part of the Juegos Nacionales Escolares (National School Games). These games
encouraged more participation in sport because of the platform it gave athletes.95 The
various opportunities and obligations to participate in sport under Franco’s regime would
ensure that “el amor y la idea del servicio a la Patria” (“the love and idea of service to the
Homeland”) was instilled in all young people.96
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Conclusion
Through the creation of national physical education programs, youth
organizations, and sports clubs, the totalitarian regimes of Italy, Germany, and Spain
prepared the masses for military mobilization. While the loss of World War II and Spain’s
non-involvement in the war suggests that the extent of the military preparation on the
physical front may have been insufficient, the regimes did succeed in improving the
overall health and fitness of their countries. Italy’s physical education program,
specifically, would become the basis for a number of other countries’s programs.
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III.

Construction of a National Identity

Totalitarian regimes relied heavily on their ability to control and gain support
from the masses. This type of mass manipulation manifested itself in the creation of a
national identity directly linked to the state. The regime used the national identity to
foster a culture of consent and culture of evasion.
Totalitarian governments didn’t have the explicit backing of the public to rule like
democratic governments to legitimize their regime, nor did they have the resources or
institutions to create significant public services or policies to win over the public by
improving societal conditions. Therefore, regimes had to foster a nationwide political
culture, or civic religion, to shape values that could transcend economic issues and
political warfare to cultivate ultra-nationalist sentiment that would translate into support
for the regime. This creation of a civic religion was identified as a culture of consent. The
support and participation in cultural practices advanced the values of the state and
appeared to legitimize the regime’s rule.97
Alternatively, rather than trying to attract state support through the development
of culture, totalitarian regimes also used culture to distract from their political failures.
Wherever totalitarianism existed, so did oppression, humiliation, and suffering.
Therefore, the regime sought to promote or highlight the more positive aspects of their
national culture. The daily practice of cultural celebration acted as what Karl Marx called
the “opiate of the masses.”

98

Cultural practices helped consume the time, energy, and

interest of people who may otherwise be concerned with political issues. This created a
97

De Grazia, The Culture, 178.
Thomas Gift and Andrew Miner, "'Dropping the Ball': The Understudied Nexus of Sports and Politics,"
World Affairs 180, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 143, https://doi.org/10.1177/0043820017715569.
98

34

national culture of evasion. As explained by journalist David Zirin, “many of us watch
ESPN to forget at all costs what they are doing on C-SPAN.” 99
Prior to the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s, sports took place largely outside of
the political sphere. Beyond some allusions to the government during the games of
national teams, sports occurred without any reference to a regime. Even after the
politicization of sports by totalitarian regimes, democratic governments clung to the
cliche of politics not mixing well with sports.100 British Home Secretary Sir John Simon
emphasized in 1935 that, “the introduction of political feeling into what should be a
purely sporting contest is … most undesirable.” 101
Germany, Spain, and Italy all utilized nationalist sentiment to foster cultures of
consent and evasion to varying degrees. However, one consistency between them was
their use of sports to shape their national identity. Totalitarian regimes identified sport as
a valuable and unique cultural practice that could assist in the consolidation of the nation.
Sports, unlike other forms of cultural practice such as art, literature, and theater,
connected citizens of all socio-economic statuses, occupations, races, and religions.102 It
required no education or language, and was still relatively cheap, especially when the
state began to subsidize it. Stadiums could hold tens of thousands of fans in a shared
space, and, with the introduction of radio and television broadcasts, games could be
easily projected to massive audiences.103
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Sports also helped form bonds between communities. As explained by Norbert
Elias, sport participation and spectatorship can often be framed through an “us” versus
“them” mentality, in reference to a favored group and their competitor. Fans and players
alike identify with one another due to their relationship with sports teams.104 Therefore,
when a regime aligns itself with a team, usually done at the national level, the bond
created between supporters extends to include a bond created with the state, and can
transcend local and regional affiliations. Furthermore, sporting events can help form
popular memories and sporting heroes and mythology, which are essential in creating a
collective identity and culturally significant images of a nation.105
Sports were especially persuasive due to their apolitical nature. Sports are largely
meritocratic and appear difficult for outside forces to manipulate. However, it is not
necessary for a regime to interfere with the outcome of the game for it to be used for
propaganda. Rather, it is the spectatorship that provides a valuable venue for subtle and
covert state influence. In his work on banal nationalism, Billig identifies how regimes are
able to subtly and covertly remind their citizens of their national identity through daily
experiences devoid of obvious politics. These occurrences help ideologies embed
themselves in the psychology of the masses. This passive form of mindless indoctrination
helps establish unity against outside challenges.106 Sports games provide spaces to display
flags, state colors, and national anthems. Stadiums show architectural prowess,
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technological advancement, and are decorated with images of the state. Even the style of
play could reveal the values of the regime.107

Italy
Mussolini subscribed to Gustave Le Bon’s thesis The Crowd - A Study of the
Popular Mind. In The Crowd, Le Bon offers a tempting political strategy: “to know the
art of impressing the imagination of crowds . . . is to know as well the art of governing
them.”108 Mussolini’s understanding of psychology of the masses led him to choose sport
as a vehicle for nationalist propaganda. If he could impress the masses with sporting
success, he could govern them.
Mussolini’s regime was one of the first modern governments to understand how to
use sport as a means of political propaganda. He recognized that “the road to power lay
through the mastery of collective psychology, the manipulation of mass passions,” and, as
a passionate sportsman himself, Mussolini recognized the ability of sports to engage and
impassion the masses.109
The Fascist regime took on the challenge of uniting the young and deeply
fractured nation. Sports provided a subtle, yet exciting way to educate and engage Italians
in unified cultural experiences. For example, the cycling race Giro d'Italia would pass
through important geographical landmarks that were highlighted in radio broadcasts and
news reports. The subtle use of propaganda helped both educate Italians about different
regions of their countries, as well as show off important nationalistic markers.110 The race
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was lauded for its “patriotic work of familiarization [and] brotherhood”, which
“penetrated” Southern Italy with “competitive enthusiasm, industrial vigor, and
organizational ability.”111 Cycling was able to easily engage mass audiences in Italy
because most spectators did not need to purchase tickets to watch from their homes or the
road side.112 Furthermore, the distance aspect of cycling meant people across the country
were able to spectate the same event, rather than a sport that would be contained in one
stadium in one city. Similarly, the Mille Miglia (Thousand Miles) car race helped show
off the nation’s development through its advanced road network and skillful building of
cars. Success in motorsports helped build an image of a futuristic and competitive Italy.113
No sport, however, was used as a unifying force more so than football. The Italian
manipulation of the nation’s most popular sport would set a precedent for totalitarian
rulers to come. Mussolini’s investment in football transformed the sport into its modern
national format and developed a strong sense of shared identity among the Italian
people.114 One of the most significant divides in Italian society was that between the
North and the South. While Northern Italy, mainly Turin and Milan, had developed a
robust sporting culture, southern Italy lacked the infrastructure and economic resources to
invest heavily. Separate football leagues meant there was little to no engagement between
the geographical regions, and, when there was, the North dominated. This further
contributed to the Northern perception of Southerners as “inferior” Italians. Mussolini
recognized this divide as detrimental to the national identity and sought to correct it.
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The most significant alteration to Italian sport came with the 1926 Carta di
Viareggio, which established professional football at a national level with the creation of
the Serie A league.115 The league merged the regions of Italy by taking the top eight clubs
from the north and the south to create one national, top flight league. The integration of
Serie A would contribute to that standardization of the Italian style of play and, in turn,
create a more cohesive national identity.116 Clubs that had previously been restricted to
competing in lower profile, regional leagues were now able to “officially enter into the
Italian football family,” thereby affirming their Italian identity.117 It would also lead to
increased interaction between northern and southern fans as games between teams from
the different regions would be played more regularly. The Carta di Viareggio also banned
non-Italian players from the league as foreign players were deemed untalented and
lacking the necessary commitment in comparison to their Italian peers. The regime also
banned English football terms and translated them to Italian. These nationalist rules were
a part of the regime’s racial ideologies.118 All the structural changes helped improve the
Italian national team through the development of Italian players across the nation, rather
than just the north and the formation of a distinct style of play.119
The Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC), the governing body of Italian
football, was moved south from Turin to Rome. This move was seen as an opportunity to
centralize the game, to further integrate southern football officials into the federation, and
align the federation more closely with the regime.120
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The success of the regime’s plan was seen during the national team’s first ever
game in Rome in 1928. The central location brought together northern and southern fans
for the first truly national game, and was intended “to strengthen and extend to the
southern regions that unification of national sporting activity [...] makes a notable
contribution to the political and spiritual unification of Italy.”121 The event was described
as an “organizational success that confounded many unwise prejudices against the
southern crowd.”122 It was clear from early on in Mussolini’s reign that football could
serve as a powerful unifying force in Italian society.
Le Bon’s theory of the management of the masses further materialized under
Mussolini with the construction of the management of football stadiums. Sport
spectatorship promised an opportunity to distribute fascist propaganda to an audience of
tens of thousands united in their passion for sport.123 Football stadiums, unlike many
other cultural activities, brought together thousands of people of all different
socio-economic backgrounds from different regions of the country. No other venue
provided a space of guaranteed engagement and excitement like a football stadium. Thus,
the Commissione Impianti Sportivi (CIS), part of CONI, identified stadiums as important
investment opportunities for the regime: “Each sporting work, from the most modest to
the monumental, is always a potent and efficient method of propaganda. Thus it largely
needs to satisfy not only the technical demands of who trains there, to encourage him to
persevere in his noble work, but also the needs of the spectator.” 124
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The architectural design of stadiums carried their own clear propaganda. To
display the efficiency of the Italian regime, the massive structures were built with
incredible speed: the Stadio Mussolini in Turin was completed in just six months.125
Stadiums symbolized Italy’s Roman imperial past, present Fascist technological strength,
and future promise. A description of the Littorialle in Bologna stated: “towers, in general,
were striking symbolic features of Fascist architecture which represented a combination
of the medieval civic power and an abstract symbol of authority.”

126

Statues and art

honoring fascist icons decorated the stadium “to transform comradeship into tribalism,
pride into a sense of superiority, a sense of belonging into hatred of outsiders.” 127
Since stadiums were such important venues of propaganda for the regime, they
were granted a privileged position in the allocation of public funds. The government
underwrote the stadiums in Rome, Bologna, Turin, and Florence and offered football
teams that played in them subsidies and tax breaks.128 The massive stadiums, seating tens
of thousands of people, provided the ideal opportunity for all Italians to participate in the
collective struggle, joy, and drama that played out in each game. Steep terraces ensured
that no onlooker would be alienated from the action on the pitch.129 Each game further
ingratiated the masses in a celebration of Italian strength and culture.
Nationalistic sentiments were spread beyond the cofines of a stadium with the rise
in sports broadcasting in the late 1920s. Prior to the radio in the early days of fascism,
newspapers and magazines represented the most widespread means for disseminating
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information in Italy. Mussolini’s background as a journalist meant he was especially in
tune with the importance of media as an instrument of propaganda.130 Sports press proved
to be an extremely effective way to subtly push propaganda due to the seemingly
apolitical and meritocratic nature of sports. Sports journalism appeared on the surface to
have more freedom of expression and less government control in comparison to other
forms of news. However, the totalitarian nature of the regime meant all aspects of life,
including sports, were politicized.131 Sports journalists, under Mussolini, promoted the
moralization of sports and the integration of fascist values into Italian athletic culture.
Sports magazines were an important part of fascist propaganda in Italy, but high
illiteracy rates and low levels of urban living during the early years of Mussolini’s reign
meant written propaganda did not reach a wide audience.132 While written sports reports
and commentaries were certainly an effective piece of propaganda, the radio made the
transmission of this information easier, quicker, and more engaging. Radio broadcasts in
Italy began just two years after Mussolini came to power in 1924. The first sports
broadcast, an Italian win over Hungary, took place in 1928.133 From then on, radio use
skyrocketed. The number of radio subscribers increased from an estimated 27,000 in
1926 to over one million at the end of 1939.134 Millions would gather at local bars, cafes,
and recreational centers to listen to games their favorite teams play. Much like stadiums,
the tradition of listening to games in public locations fostered a sense of collective
identity.135 Furthermore, unlike written sports journalism, the radio was able to transmit
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the passion and spirit of football through the voices of sports commentators. This passion
encouraged the celebration of Italian sporting success and a triumphant physical culture.

Spain
As with many other totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, the Franco
regime came to power through war and maintained its power with terror and violence.
However, fear alone is unsustainable for the long-term governance of a nation. The
Franco regime relied on the active collaboration of different sectors of society in order to
both engage and placate Spanish citizens. Franco sought to develop what has been
referred to as the “acquiescence to the dictatorship” amongst Spanish society, meaning
Spanish society would grow to accept the facist regime, not with glowing praise, but with
silent consent.136 This passivity would afford Franco one of the longest reigns of any
totalitarian leader in modern Europe.
To achieve this level of acquiescence, Franco adopted the Roman philosophy of
“bread and circuses”, and almost no other activity provided the “circus” that Spanish
football offered. The daily drama and passion that sport provided at all levels of the
games for both active participants and spectators would become an incredibly popular
distraction and source of joy for all classes of Spanish society.137 Football, specifically,
was the primary focus of the Franco regime.
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Despite this general love for sports, underfunding and poorly run state-controlled
agencies lead to the underdevelopment of Spanish sports.138 In the six Olympic Games
that Franco’s Spain participated in, they won just one gold medal, two silver and two
bronze. Beyond a handful of outstanding individual athletes, like gymnast Joaquín
Blume, cyclists Guillermo Timoner and Federico Bahamontes, or tennis player Manuel
Santana, the regime relied on private football clubs to cover up their lack of sporting
success.139 Even the Spanish national football team performed incredibly poorly during
Franco’s regime, as private clubs were largely composed of foreign football stars, and
Franco was unwilling to invest in the development of the Spanish game.140 The national
team failed to qualify for the 1954, 1958, 1970 or 1974 World Cups and were eliminated
early in the 1962 and 1966 Cups.141 Thus, domestic football, and the most successful
Spanish club at the time Real Madrid, would become the “circus” that Franco would
exploit and manipulate to unify and placate the masses.
Franco took control of an extremely fragmented nation. Spain encompasses a
number of historical nationalities and ethnicities, the most dominant being Castilian,
Catalan, and Basque. Castile is the dominant nationality in Spain, as Spain was united
under the Crown of Castile; however, the remaining nationalities retain unique
geographical distinctions, languages, and cultural practices. With the loss of colonial
Cuba in 1898, many Spaniards sought to reshape their national identity.142 This period of
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national transition inspired Basque and the Catalan nationalist movements. Emerging
industrial bourgeois classes in the regions espoused an anti-Madrid, anti-Spain sentiment
and began investing in their respective regions.143 Cultural renaissances transitioned into
fierce political movements, largely founded upon decentralization and autonomous
regions.144
General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s seizure of power in 1923 brought a halt to the
growth of Catalan and Basque regionalism. The authoritarian regime banned regional
movements and autonomous governments within Spain. The strict enforcement of this
ban reverberated through all of society, including football.145 After FC Barcelona fans
booed the Spanish national anthem, Primo de Rivera closed the team’s stadium for six
months and forced the club president to resign. It was during this period of political
repression that football began to take on symbolic significance.146 Football clubs, such as
F.C. Barcelona in Catalonia and Athletic de Bilbao in Euzkadi, or Basque Country,
became some of the few symbols of regional identities that were legally permitted. For
example, the banned flag of Catalonia, the Senyera, was substituted with the flag of FC
Barcelona during political demonstrations.147 After the fall of Spain’s first dictator, the
regional clubs retained their political significance. Under the Second Republic, FC
Barcelona and Athletic de Bilbao both actively backed their respective region’s
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autonomy. When the Civil War broke out in 1936, many players joined the fight against
Franco's military.148
Franco identified these schismatic tendencies as a challenge to his region, and
necessary to shut down for the long-term success of his reign. Furthermore, creating a
strong national identity would help legitimize the regime and overcome periods of
struggle the nation may face. Football was identified as a tool that could both benefit and
harm the regime. Bilbao-based Falangist Jacinto Miquelarena recognized the importance
of Athletic de Bilbao in Euzkadi and warned that football, “has a great defect, which is
the bad thing about it: it stimulates regionalism.” 149 Alternatively, he suggested that:
The State must appropriate sports. Sports have the capacity to found a nationality,
and to reduce an old Empire to microscopic segments. There is the “love for the
club,” a poor feminine love, an attraction to colors and ribbons; and there is or
there can be the “love of the great patriotic idea.” […] A state that exploits the
great torrent of sport will be a powerful State.150
Thus, the Franco regime manipulated football in Spain to construct a unified national
identity.
Like his Italian counterpart, Franco applied fascistic rule to the world of Spanish
football. Club leadership was required to cooperate with the regime, or be replaced. As
president of Real Madrid, Nationalist Civil War veteran Santiago Bernabéu’s close ties to
the dictatorship turned his football club into Spain’s unofficial “national team” and
became Europe’s most successful team. On the other hand, FC Barcelona’s president at
the beginning of the Civil War was Josep Sunyol, one of the most visible members of
anti-Spanish political organizations “Acció Catalana” and “Esquerra Republicana de
148

Goig, "Identity, Nation‐State," 58.
Vaczi, "'The Spanish," 203-4.
150
Vaczi, 203.
149

46

Catalunya.” Sunyol was killed by Nationalist forces in 1936.151 A series of Francoists
would be appointed to fill Sunyol’s role after his assassination. Members of the Falange
were assigned to executive boards and upper management roles across football clubs in
Spain. The regime also made Castilian the official language and banned the use of
minority languages. This meant all football clubs were required to Castilianize their
names. Futbol Club Barcelona, which was Catalan, was changed to Club de Fútbol de
Barcelona. Athletic de Bilbao and Sporting Gijón, which had assumed the English name
out of homage to its British roots, were changed to Atlético de Bilbao and Deportivo
Gijón.152 Traditionally foreign sports terms, such as ‘corner’, ‘amateur’ and ‘match’, were
similarly translated to Castilian.153 Regionalist symbols were also banned. FC Barcelona’s
crest, which contained the Senyera, had to be changed. Sports fans that carried any
symbols of regional identity could be punished with imprisonment.154 The regime
completed the transformation of Spanish football in 1943 when the domestic cup
competition, the Copa del Rey, was renamed the Copa del Generalisimo in honor of the
dictator.155
Perhaps more so than eradicating regional identities, the regime pursued the
manipulation of them and their relationship with the central government. For example,
the national football teams of Castile and Catalonia played a reconciliatory match two
years after the end of the civil war.156 The game was meant to display a tolerance for
regional identities and help reduce regional tensions. It also aided in the impression that
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sports under the regime would be an apolitical, neutral venue. Furthermore, while Real
Madrid would become the most successful football club in Europe, both Athletic de
Bilbao and FC Barcelona would have immense success and fame internationally as well.
Their international achievements would contribute to the diplomatic goals of the regime,
which will be discussed in Chapter Four.
Football was identified by the regime as distracting from the ails of society.
Especially in the post-Civil War era, the victors sought to distract from the trauma of the
three year long conflict and misery and repression that followed. The demand for cheap
entertainment was incredibly high, and football seemed to be the ideal solution. Despite
the quality of play being exceptionally poor due to many leading players being killed in
the war or exiled by the regime, football stadiums were almost always filled to capacity.
The lack of skilled players mattered little to the war-weary spectators.157
During the 1950 World Cup, one of the few World Cups that Franco’s Spain did
well in, the media was blanketed with news of their success. Films of Spanish victories
leading up to the 4th place finish were flown back from Brazil two days after the game
and projected on large screens around the country. The propagation of nationalist ideas
through football only continued to grow throughout the 1960s with the use of television
transmissions. State-owned television company Televisión Española (TVE) brought
football to the whole of Spain and football was undoubtedly one of the most popular
showings.158 With the streaming of football, more so than ever, sport was used as a
distraction and to project the successes of the regime for all of Spain. Spain showed more
football matches annually than any other country for most of the ‘60s. Nearly 80% of
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those matches were watched by an audience of between ten and fifteen million. More
important matches, especially El Clásicos (matches between Real Madrid and FC
Barcelona) and cup finals, had viewing audiences of nearly half of the Spanish
population, over 15 million. On five occasions, the audience exceeded 20 million
Spaniards.159 Major games, such as Spain's victory in the 1964 European Nations’ Cup,
were replayed for more than a week after the final so that fans could “relive the
sensational Spanish triumph.” 160
The regime didn’t simply want to distract from the day-to-day repression and
misery. The regime also sought to suppress and hide protests to give the appearance of
domestic peace. The first Secretary for Information and Press after the Franco regime
reflected on the regime’s use of sport:
For years, Spanish sport was effectively reduced to football, always employed as
a drug to make the man in the street forget his everyday problems, and used
systematically on the eve of the most conflictive public holidays. Manuel Fraga,
specifically, combined the fiestas of football and bulls for all of the May Day
public holidays, culminating a few years ago, one 30 April, in a television
transmission of all of the goals ever scored by the Spanish national team.161
During the Franco regime, May Day, the Spanish version of Labor Day, was
characterized by illegal demonstrations of opposition parties and the independent trade
unions. To distract from the massive protests, TVE populated its schedule with live
matches and highlights of the best games. At least four football matches, live and
replayed, were played over the span of the annual protests.162 For May Day in 1966, the
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government requested that the Spanish basketball league championship game between FC
Barcelona and Real Madrid be brought forward three days to coincide with the protests.
The game was watched by approximately 14 million Spaniards.163

Germany
Unlike in Italy and Spain, professional sports and sports clubs had not taken hold
in Germany when Hitler came to power. Despite a similar love for sports, the
professionalization of the sport had not been allowed in the post-World War One era by
the government. Rather, the highest level of sport remained amateur. This amateurism
would become an important aspect of Nazism. Nazi ideology celeberated membership in
the racial collectivity of the Volk, and individual sporting excellence clashed with the idea
of Volksgemeinschaft, national unity.164 Therefore, when Hitler instituted sporting
programs for the promotion of nationalism and Nazi ideology, the main focus of the
policies would be on uplifting and indoctrinating the entire Aryan population, rather than
the success of a few sporting stars.
The first step in uplifting the Aryan population was ensuring that non-Aryan
people, mainly Jewish people, could not play organized sports. By giving Jews space to
compete, Hitler would be giving Jews space to prove his anti-semetic ideology wrong,
which he did not want to risk. Furthermore, the sporting clubs of the 1920s and early ‘30s
had largely formed around political, religious, or cultural identities, and Hitler feared
Jewish clubs would spread and promote community building and shared identity amongst
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“the most dangerous enemy - perhaps the only enemy able to destroy our culture.”165
Jewish people were also accused of being a threat to the Volksgemeinschaft in that they
were believed to be promoting professionalization and the individualist glorification of
athletes, as well as introducing foreign sports into German society. Nazi Bruno Malitz
wrote of Jews in sport:
[A]ny people who hypocritically glorify sports should be driven out… Whatever a
Jew holds up as being of value is poisonous. Look at the newspapers that glorify
sport - they're all Jewish. Page after page of it. One minute... for the people, the
next for profit. Jewish sport leaders... the Jewish poison in sport.. have no place in
German sport. They are worse than cholera, lung disease, syphilis, worse than the
rampaging hordes of the Kalmucks, worse than a flaming conflagration, famine,
floods, drought, locusts and poison gas - worse than all these because these kill
only Germans whereas the latter kills Germany itself.166
The Third Reich banned non-Nazi political sports clubs and began encouraging sports
teams to purge Jewish and communist members the year Hitler came to power. Sports
clubs were not allowed to have more than 20 percent of their members come from
already banned organizations. In 1935, the regime banned religious football clubs to
officially purge the sport of Jewish teams and players.167 Only Nazi-sponsored clubs and
associations would be allowed in Germany after this. Some of Germany’s most famous
footballers, including German National Team player Julius Hirsch, were banned from the
sport and murdered by the Nazis due to their Jewish heritage.168
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This practice was also extend into Nazi-occupied territories. Austria, who were
one of the great footballing nations at the time, were home to famous Jewish club Hakoah
Wein.169 Hakoah Wein was founded in 1909 by Zionists. They play with the Star of David
on their blue and white jerseys. The team played in the top professional league in Austria
and attracted Jewish players from all of Europe with higher wages and a dynamic Jewish
community. Hakoah won the 1925 league season and were lauded for breaking negative
stereotypes about Jewish athleticism. German sporting magazine Fussball praised the
team's success because it “helped do away with the fairy tale about the physical
inferiority of the Jews.”

170

Following the Austrian Anschluss, Hakoah Wein was shut

down by the Nazis. Their match results were scrubbed from record books. All of
Hoakah’s games that had already taken place in the 1938 season were rewritten as forfeits
and opponents were awarded 3-0 wins. Six former Hakoah players would die in the
Holocaust, a complete erasure of Jewish athletic excellence.171
The high levels of participation in sport due to the mandatory nature of physical
education mentioned in Chapter Two, as well as the general popularity of sports meant
that athletic associations were prime locations to indoctrinate people with Nazi ideology.
Nazi propaganda and indoctrination was present at all levels of German sport. At the
highest level, the regime changed the title of sporting events and festivals to honor the
new dictator. The National Championships was changed to the National Socialist
Championships, distance marching competitions became "Adolf Hitler pack-marches",
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and a new stadium in Stuttgart was named "Adolf-Hitler-Kampfbahn". The re-titling of
stadiums and competitions reinforced the presence and leadership of the Third Reich.172
The regime also created a Dietwart office which would work with the National
Physical Education Union and the Office of the People's Enlightenment in Political and
Racial Questions to provide an ideological education to athletes.173 Sport club directors
became known as Fuhrers and each one was assigned a “Dietwart,” who were responsible
for the indoctrination of their club members. Dietwart commissars were educated at Nazi
Institutions on party philosophy, attended monthly training courses in regional party
training centers, and instructed to educate clubs on the historical and philosophical
background of the Nazi party, as well as current political events.174 Players would be
tested on important facts like the date of Hitler’s birthday, the origins of the swastika, and
Jews as an enemy of the German race.175 The Nazis also brought all club youth progams
into the Hitler Youth. The Hitler Youth, similarly to the Dietwart program, provided an
ideological education for the young players. By 1936, no independent youth clubs
remained.176
Sport became especially important during war. Sports as popular as football were
originally an area of concern for the Third Reich because they viewed it as a dangerous
alternative passion to Nazism. The social capital that some football clubs held worried the
regime for its potential to cause division within society.177 However, this passion became
an important distraction from the long and arduous fighting that occurred during the war
172
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or the trauma from occupation by Nazi forces. Before war broke out in Poland, the
German National team toured the Nazi-occupied territories to play reconciliatory matches
against local teams and raise morale. These games would continue until 1942 when some
national team players were called upon to help with war efforts. The domestic league
would continue play throughout the entire war.178
Hitler had to rely heavily on football as a distraction during the war because the
cause of the war seemed largely unjustifiable to many Germans. Whereas Allied forces
could justify war efforts as necessary to stop the encroachment of Nazis, Hitler had few
tangible justifications for such a costly and devastating war.179 Especially with the
invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, many Germans questioned if the potential
philosophical and financial benefits of the war would be worth it in the end. The regime
hoped to distract its people of misery wartime Germany and make them “feel their lives
had been only mildly disrupted, as in a rail strike or a snowstorm.”180 Football matches
seemed to be the obvious answer as a distraction because it had become one of the most
popular pastimes in European society and it was much easier to provide than money,
food, or safety. Famous German footballer Fritz Walter recalled being mobbed by
German soldiers in the middle of the war: “For them I am the embodiment of concepts
lost forever: peace, home, sport.”181
Domestic football continued amidst Allied air raids and attacks. In fact, air raids
were so frequent that exact kick-off times would be kept secret until a few hours before

178

Benoit, "The Politicization," 543.
Simon Kuper, Ajax, the Dutch, the War: Football in Europe during the Second World War (London:
Orion, 2004).
180
Kuper, Ajax, the Dutch.
181
Benoit, "The Politicization," 542.
179

54

the game. Despite the risk, thousands would still show up to cheer on their teams,
including an audience of seventy thousand people at the 1944 league final just days after
Allied troops landed in Normandy.182 In the nazi-occupied Netherlands, football
flourished. Spectatorship and participation soared after the occupation began. During the
year of the invasion, over four million tickets for sporting events were sold. By 1943, that
figure had doubled.183 Football “seemed to have become a basic human need, almost like
eating and sex. The Dutch weren’t about to give it up just because of a genocide.”

184

Despite the Allied forces knocking on the doors of Munich at the end of April 1945,
25,000 fans attended a friendly match between the city’s two biggest clubs.185

Conclusion
Sports helped foster a celebratory culture of consent that legitimized the regime
and backed its ultra-nationalist sentiments. Sports provided a space to both learn and
espouse national identity, as well as unite citizens in shared passions. Sports also
contributed to a culture of evasion that allowed regimes to distract and suppress larger
political, economic, and social issues. Technological advances that overlapped with the
reign of European totalitarianism, such as radios and televisions, provided new mediums
to push propaganda.

182

Kuper, Ajax, the Dutch.
Benoit, "The Politicization," 543.
184
Kuper, Ajax, the Dutch.
185
Benoit, "The Politicization," 543.
183

55

IV.

International Diplomacy

The militarization and nationalization of totalitarian society inevitably lent itself
to the desire to assert the regime’s international dominance. Spain, Germany, and Italy
were all recovering from international humiliation and took every opportunity to improve
their standing on the global stage. Though the three regime’s had dramatically different
diplomatic goals, and goals that varied throughout each leader's reign, sports were central
to their achievement.
International sports provided an invaluable tool for promoting international
prestige due to the standardization of success. Unlike almost all other forms of culture,
international sport offered a universal set of rules that determined a clear and meritocratic
winner. Sport provided an objective and tangible metric to compare two nations, and did
so on a platform that attracted extraordinary levels of public attention.186 Thus, for
regimes who could not compete economically or politically, sports were one arena in
which they could try to excel.
International competitions, the most significant of which were the Olympics and
the FIFA men’s football World Cup, provided more opportunities for regimes to impress
foreign countries than just the game on the pitch. Hosting international competitions
afforded nations the platform to show off their culture, history, and organizational
capacity. Regimes aligned themselves with rhetoric of mega-sports events as a space for
cosmopolitanism, peace, and international harmony, even if that was not an accurate
reflection of their government outside of the bounds of the event. Fans and athletes acted
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as ambassadors for the regime and would help achieve the state’s strategic objectives.187
Hosting and participating in international sporting competitions became valuable
opportunities for totalitarian regimes to push their ideology and the image of a peaceful
and successful nation.

Italy
Though Italy hadn’t always performed well in athletic competitions, Mussolini’s
investment in sport for the general improvement of health and military preparation
(highlighted in Chapter Two) had the added benefit of improving overall athletic
competitiveness in domestic and international sporting competition. While early fascist
sporting performances returned poor results, the militarization of the masses would help
with “manufacturing champions” that would turn Italy into a dominant sporting force in
the 1930s.188 This transition was highlighted in top sports magazine La Gazzetta dello
Sport: “Athleticism has made great progress among the young. The [1928] Amsterdam
Olympics will certainly not confirm it, but the reserves are being created and the future
will show that a good wine is coming.”189 Mussolini would use his country’s high-profile
sporting successes to gain international prestige by projecting an image of a strong,
well-developed, and united nation shaped by a skilled and popular fascist government.
While Italy did not perform spectacularly at the 1928 Olympic Games, it was one
of the first major international sporting events Mussolini used as international
propaganda. Italian athletes drove in a convoy of over fifty cars from top racing teams in
187
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Milan and Bologna to show the “national solidarity that reigns in Italy today . . . of how
much youth and fervor has brought this country to life.”190 Italy’s performance was
highlighted by a semi-final finish in the football competition in which the Azzurri, Italy’s
national football team, narrowly lost to Uruguay. Italy’s overall medal count tallied up to
just 18 medals, but with France, England and Belgium’s performance seemingly in
decline, Italian media saw this mediocre success as the beginning of Italy “marching at
the vanguard of modern sport.”191
Sport assumed even greater propagandist significance in the 1932 Los Angeles
Olympics. Dressed in black shirts like soldiers in Mussolini’s army, the Italian team
marched in a choreographed Fascist parade during the opening ceremony and performed
the fascist salute. The second place finish in overall medal count proved even greater
progress in Italy’s sporting ability.192 The 1932 Olympics was followed by nearly a
decade of sporting success: Italian drivers won the European Drivers Championship in
1931 and ‘32; Italo Balbo flew across the Atlantic to Chicago in June 1933; Primo
Carnera won the world heavyweight boxing title in July 1933; the Azzurri won the World
Cup in 1934 and 1938, as well as the Central European International Cup and Olympic
title in 1936; and Gino Bartali won the Tour de France in 1938.
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clubs also enjoyed success in this period, especially the Bologna FC, which won the
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Mitropa Cup in 1932 and 1934 and beat English side Chelsea in the Paris Exhibition
Tournament in 1937.195
The Azzurri also played a series of politically significant football matches during
this period to symbolize diplomatic alliances. Matches were regularly held between Italy
and central European countries. This region was of particular importance to the Italian
regime due to the power vacuum that emerged following the fall of the Austro-Hungarian
empire after World War I.196 Regular competition between the nations provided an
opportunity for the regime to develop relations with the new nations in the volatile area.
The aforementioned Central European International Cup, founded in 1927, ensured
games between the participating nations: Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. The same year the Cup was founded, a series of bilateral peace agreements
between Italy, Austria and Hungary were also signed.197 Italy’s relationship with Austria
was especially important because the small country of Austria relied on Italy for
protection against German aggression. In 1934, Italy would even subsidize the Austrian
Football Association so they could afford to play in the World Cup.198
Similarly, an important game was played against Britain in 1933. Britain was
hoping to improve their relationship with Italy to counter the sway of Germany, where
Adolf Hitler had just come to power.199 Italy, who had not formed an alliance with the
new fascist regime, also hoped to improve their relationship with the Home Nations in
case of German expansion. Mussolini sought to show the regime’s apparent mass support
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through fan attendance at the match. The strategy seemed to work because the head of the
English party remarked after the match, “I was profoundly moved by the warm
demonstration the crowd gave to the head of government . . . today I had the true
impression of the fondness the crowd has for the Duce.”200
This relationship between the Italy and European democracies, the mutual desire
to improve their relationship, likely contributed to the 1932 decision to allow Mussolini’s
regime to host the 1934 World Cup. Another important factor that contributed to the
decision was Italy’s willingness to take on all financial obligations because Mussolini
wanted to present the regime as reliable and financially successful. However, by 1934,
the relationship between Great Britain and Italy had deteriorated while Mussolini and
Hitler were beginning to form their alliance. The Brits decided not to attend the 1934
World Cup due to increasing hostility between the two governments.201 It is important to
note that Great Britain did not fear retaliation for the decision to not to participate in the
event, whereas the Brits would make a very different decision with the 1936 Olympics
Games for fear of backlash from the Third Reich.
Regardless of the presence of the Home Nations, Italy would go all out to impress
the visiting countries because Mussolini knew the “attention of the world of sport will
turn itself on Italy.”202 Italy set aside a budget of an astonishing 3.5 million lira for the
tournament. Notably, the 1934 World Cup would be the first time FIFA’s payments would
be in a currency other than the sterling or dollars. The decision to use the Italian lira
200
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suggested an “official recognition that Italian currency offers a greater confidence and
guarantee than that of other foreign currencies.”203
The regime organized the World Cup to display Italian fascist strength and power.
No aspects of the tournament were left to chance. All cities that would host games were
selected for their beauty and strong presence of imperial Italian culture interlaced with
modern fascist innovations. The eight chosen cities also had newly constructed stadiums
constructed in accordance to the fascist aesthetic, as discussed in Chapter three, three of
which were specifically designed for the tournament.204 From a tourism point of view,
Mussolini had invested in Italy’s crumbling railway system. Therefore, Mussolini
encouraged railway travel to Italy for the World Cup to show off their advanced rail
network.205 He even offered fans from France, Holland, Switzerland and Germany
discounted train travel to and throughout Italy, as well as subsidized hotel rooms.206 The
Italian World Cup had the highest number of foreign fans in attendance of any football
tournament at the time.207 The Italiano per le Audizioni Radiofoniche (Italian Body for
Radio Broadcasting) would, for the first time ever, sell international radio rights so the
tournament could be broadcast throughout Europe and South America to ensure that
those who couldn’t attend in person could still listen in.208
To complement the impressive setting of the tournament, the regime also invested
heavily in a merchandising campaign. Tickets to the tournament were decorated and
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printed on high quality paper to be kept as commemorative souvenirs. 100,000 posters
and 300,000 postcards were printed for mass distribution.209 The government
commissioned a limited edition brand of cigarettes called “Campionato del Mondo.”
Commemorative postage stamps featuring fasces and images of the stadiums were also
issued. These items were believed to be “a great work of world propaganda for Italianità,
connecting in everlasting signs the characteristics of sport with the Fascio Littorio,
reconfirming to all the world that Italian Sport had been strengthened by Fascism.”210
There would be no greater piece of propaganda, however, than the Italian
National Team winning the entire tournament. Their victory seemed to prove
Musssolini’s claim of “racial superiority that [is] destined to reflect in many fields outside
of sport.”211 Despite criticism of the Azzurri’s aggressive style of play and rumors of
Mussolini fixing the games, the international community did seem to accept that Italy
was the best football team in the world, or at least second to the unproven British side.212
French journalist Maurice Pefferkorn praised the Italian Football team for their “model of
play, a dazzling example of style, and an Italian school is already talked of, to which one
needs to aspire. This is perhaps the greatest recognition, the most significant eulogy: the
azzurri have become the masters.”213 There was also immense praise for the modern
stadiums and impeccable organization of the tournament that seemed to translate into the
general acceptance and perhaps even admiration for the fascist regime. An official from
the powerful Hungarian Football Association praised the regime because “from Torino
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and Trieste to Tàranto and Palermo, Italy shakes with healthy sporting enthusiasm, while
ten years ago sport, as it is understood today, had not reached Rome.”214 The tournament
would also prove to be significant in that it would host the first meeting between Hitler
and Mussolini. Germany’s third place finish brought the German dictator to Italy. Four
days after the closing celebration, Hitler would meet Mussolini for the first time in
Venice. 215
Italy’s gold medal in the 1936 Olympics football tournament and domination in
the 1938 France Cup seemed to confirm Italy as a footballing world power. Their
successes seemed to prove that their previous victory on home turf had not been due to
home field advantage. Their 1936 win in conjunction with the Nazi success at the Games
affirmed the fascist regimes as sporting powerhouses. Furthermore, amidst growing
Franco-Italian tension, the victory in 1938 was even more significant because it was a
victory in “hostile territory.”216

Germany
Following World War I, Germany faced a period of isolationism. As the assigned
initiators of the Great War, Allied Powers sought to exclude the nation from the
international sphere. It wasn’t until the signing of the Pact of Locarno and their entry into
the League of Nations five years after the end of the war that Germany began slowly
being accepted back into global politics.217 Under the democratic Weimar Republic, it
appeared as though Germany would become a natural ally to its neighbors to the west,
214

Martin, Football and Fascism, 184.
Tomlinson and Young, National Identity, 57.
216
Martin, Football and Fascism, 193.
217
Krüger, "The Role," 81.
215

63

and Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy were all warming up to the idea of
improving their relationships with the country.
This mending of relationships during the 1920s was reflected in international
sports. The Olympics Games organizing committee, largely helmed by Frenchmen and
Britons, excluded the ‘arch enemy’ from the 1920 and 1924 Olympic Games. England
requested that FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) remove
Germany, Austria, and Hungary on the grounds that they had been responsible for the
First World War, but the private organization was not persuaded so the Home Nations
withdrew from FIFA in protest. 218 While protecting their status as an international
footballing country was an important win for the Germans, FIFA was still in its infancy,
having not even held their first World Cup. Germans had long valued the Olympics as the
premier international sporting event and strove to regain entry. The Germans had long
viewed the Olympics as tantamount to war:
The Olympic Games are a war, a real war. You can be sure that many participants
are willing to offer—without hesitation—several years of their life for a victory of
the fatherland...The Olympic idea of the modern era has given us a symbol of
world war, which does not show its military character very openly, but—for those
who can read sports statistics—it gives enough insight into world ranking.219
In their first Olympics after the Great War, the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics, Germany sent
the largest team, had massive crowd support, and proved themselves to be a sporting
nation with the second-highest medal count.220 The awarding of the 1936 Olympic Games
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to the Weimar Republic’s capital city, Berlin, in 1931 affirmed Germany’s status, not just
a valued competitor in international sports, but as a trusted political partner.221
Much changed, however, from the awarding of the Olympics to Berlin and the
nearly five years of political and economic turmoil that preceded the Games. When Hitler
came to power in 1933, he sought to use sport to further break Germany’s international
isolation, disguise the nature of his regime abroad, and promote Nazi ideology. During
the Weimar Republic, Germany participated in less than 20 international sporting
competitions each year. In 1933 and ‘34, Nazis increased participation to over 30 events
annually. In 1935 alone, they competed in 78.222
The most significant of these 78 events was the December 4th international
friendly between the German and English football teams. The match was organized by
England’s Football Association (FA) and would be played in London, the first time
Germany would face England on British soil.223 The match seemed to symbolize the
mending of Anglo-German relationships and, at least for Germany, the acceptance of the
Nazi Regime by one of the regime's most vocal political adversaries.
Despite concern from Home Secretary Sir John Simon that this game would be “a
piece of political propaganda in the interest of Nazis”, the FA moved forward so as to not
proke German retaliation if the game were to be canceled.224 Even as Hitler reclaimed the
Saar region and renounced the 1919 Treaty of Versailles by rearming his country, the FA
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defaulted to the international policy of appeasement by moving forward with game as if
nothing were happening.225
On the day of the match, 10,000 German supporters arrived in London for the
match. They were volunteers of the Kraft durch Freude (‘Strength through Joy’)
program, a mass tourism organization meant to promote Nazism in Germany and abroad.
For such a large group to make this trek, it was the clear that the official Nazi party
funded this excursion.226 The secretary of the General Council of the Trade Union
Congress Sir Walter Citrine noted that “such a large and carefully organised Nazi
contingent coming to London might confirm the impression among people in this country
that the event is being regarded as of some political importance by the visitors.” 227 Upon
reflection, ‘some political importance’ was a clear understatement.
The Germans sought to establish themselves as kind and cooperative to disguise
their increasingly violent anti-semetic and racist policies that had drawn international
criticism. German authorities discouraged the carrying of swastikas or singing of patriotic
songs. German players were almost excessively polite to their opponents and their fans
mixed happily with their English counterparts – a far cry from traditional English soccer
hooliganism.228 The match passed without incident and England won 3-0. The loss
seemed to lend itself perfectly to Germany’s non-threatening appearance, and the British
press praised their decent and respectful visitors.229 The President of the Anglo-German
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Fellowship and British politician Lord Mount Temple proclaimed the match to be a
turning point in relations between the two countries.230
Across the English Channel, however, the event was viewed differently. A
German newspaper described the match from its viewpoint as an “unrestricted political,
psychological and also sporting success.” 231 While it seems unlikely that any football fan
would regard a 3-0 loss a ‘sporting success’, they were correct that the Nazi were
triumphant in propagating a ‘political’ and ‘psychological’ image of a peaceful and
cooperative nation. Nazi ideologues, who had long identified sports as a valuable state
building tool, exploited the conservative English belief that politics had no place in sport
for their propaganda.232 The 1935 match would act as a testing ground for the cultural
offensive Germany would employ in the impending 1936 Olympic Games.
Hitler’s regime sought to use the Games to disguise the true nature of the regime
abroad. The primary criticism of the Third Reich prior to the games was their treatment
of German Jews.233 The increasingly blatant oppression of Jews startled many countries
around the world. As foreign Olympic Committees began raising concerns about possible
human rights abuses to the IOC, the Germans invited Avery Brundage, the President of
the US Olympic Committee, to visit Germany to investigate the conditions of
anti-semitism in Germany.234 Von Tschammer und Osten guided Brundage through
Germany’s preparation for the Games and succeeded in impressing Brundage. Upon his
return to America, Brundage expressed that reports of anti-semitism in Germany had
230
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been exagerated and the games would go off without any problems. Following US
support for the games, an international campaign to boycott the Olympics failed.235 The
Germans also claimed to demonstrate their loyalty to Olympic principles by including
Jewish athletes in their Olympic team – just one “half Jew” participated under the
German flag. Nazi leadership had been successful in their first hurdle in disguising the
true intentions of their regimes. No further complaints were raised when the Nazis moved
troops into the demilitarized Rhineland just months before the Games.236
The Third Reich used the 1936 Olympics to show off the coordination, strength,
and success of this new German society. The 77 million mark Reichssportfeld was
constructed to hold all sporting events. The primary stadium, the Olympiastadion, could
accommodate over 100,000 spectators. Huge nude figures of athletes decorated the
stadium in homage to Greek heritage of the Olympics, but with distinctly “Aryan”
features to promote Hitler’s agenda. The opening ceremony was directed by the most
famous living German musician, Richard Strauss, who led three thousand German
performers in “Deutschland Über Alles”, the Nazi Party Anthem “Horst-Wessel-Lied”,
and a new piece composed for the 1936 Games called the “Olympic hymn.” The IOC
would use the “Olympic hymn” in all future Olympic Games.237 Dramatic and technically
complex lighting, strict choreography, and some of the most famous German music
wowed the opening ceremony’s audience. Visitors left the ceremony with an impression
of a creative and artistically skilled nation. Throughout the Games, the state ordered party
members to show extreme courtesy to the visiting tourists – “even when they were visibly
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recognizable as ‘non-Aryans.’” 238 A memo was distributed throughout SA leadership
that instructed: “In these coming weeks of the Olympics we want to show foreigners that
it is a lie spread abroad that the persecution of Jews is a daily occurrence in Germany.” In
the midst of the 1936 Olympics, just over 20 miles north of the event, the concentration
camp Sachsenhausen was opened.239
Further improving their image was the Nazi’s sporting success. The Nazis topped
the medal count with 89 medals overall, 33 of which were gold. The Nazis were 33
medals ahead of their closest competitor, the US, and third place was taken by fascist ally
Italy.240 The high medal count, internationally, demonstrated German strength and the
success of Nazi physical education and, domestically, appeared to confirm Hitler’s racist
and anti-semetic beliefs surrounding the superiority of the Aryan race. Ultimately, the
1936 Olympic Games showed the world a peaceful, yet powerful Germany united under a
fascist regime. Ideologically and physically, Nazi Germany appeared to be ready to
compete with their democratic neighbors on all fronts, not just on the field.

Spain
Spain differed from Italy and Germany in their use of international sport. Franco’s
isolationist status during World War Two and his ability to maintain power after the fall
of the Axis powers meant Spain’s position on the global stage was drastically lower than
their former fascist peers. Rather than seeking to assert their dominance in Europe, Spain
had to improve their overseas image and diplomatic position just to participate in an
238
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increasingly globalized and Americanized world. For a country that was widely
ostracized for its political system, sports provided Spain a space to integrate themselves
into the new world order.
Franco came to power five months before the Nazis invaded Poland. Germany
and Italy still looked like formidable fronts against their quick-to-appease neighbors on
the continent. Hitler and Mussolini’s on-going success in annexing territories, along with
their support of Franco during the Civil War, translated into a natural alliance between the
three nations. Therefore, while the weakened Spain declared themselves to be
“non-belligerent” during the war, its bonds with the Axis powers remained strong.241 One
of the ways Spain maintained these good relationships with their totalitarian allies was
through football. The Spanish national football team took on an ambassadorial role and
played exhibition matches with Germany and Italy, as well as Salazar's Portugal and
Vichy France at the behest of the National Sports Delegation (DND). The Spanish
National Team, dressed in Franco’s blue jerseys, played their first game after the war in
Lisbon against the Portuguese side in 1941.242 The following year, Spain’s Foreign
Ministry proposed a series of exhibition matches in Milan and Berlin as a show of
international Fascist solidarity. The game against the German national team was rife with
Fascist symbolism as a mass expression of solidarity between the two regimes.243 The
avenue that led to the venue, the Berlin Olympiastadion, was decorated with thousands of
German and Spanish flags. The German team gifted Spanish ensigns to members of the
Blue Division, the Spanish troops that volunteered to fight alongside the Nazi on the
241

Alex Viuda-serrano, "A Diplomatic Mission: Spain and the 1948 London Olympics," The International
Journal of the History of Sport 27, no. 6 (April 2010): 1081, https://doi.org/10.1080/09523361003656282.
242
Shaw, "The Political," 257.
243
Quiroga, "Spanish Fury," 509.

70

Eastern front. The audience of 100,000 sang both nation’s anthems and performed the
fascist salute. Reichssportführer von Tschammer praised the match for its display of “the
beautiful and loyal friendship between two peoples who are united in combat against the
world enemy in the Russian battlefields.”
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The Royal Spanish Football Federation

(RFEF) proposed future games against the Italian and German sides, but it soon proved
impossible due to the worsening conditions of the war.245
Following the war, Spain’s ties to the Axis powers led to their ostracization by the
winning nations. By December 1946, Spain was expelled from most international
organizations and the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Spain was recalled.246 Although
Spain was still technically a member of FIFA, only Portugal and Catholic Ireland would
agree to play them. Amidst threats of embargoes and sanctions from the UN and powerful
governments, Franco sought to change the international image of Spain.247 The regime
tried to redefine itself as a Catholic government and leave behind their fascist symbols.
This shift could be seen with the national team. The blue jersey, which symbolized the
Falange and were heavily associated with the military division that fought alongside the
Nazis, were abandoned for pre-fascist, traditional red jerseys. The fascist salute at the
beginning of games was also abolished.248 Despite these cosmetic changes, foreign
nations were not quick to forget Spain’s alliance with Hitler. The RFEF’s invitations for
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friendly matches with England, France, and Italy were rebuffed by their football
associations.249
Franco’s first significant opportunity to rebuild Spain’s relationship with the
Allied powers came in 1948 with their invitation to the London Olympics. Rising
tensions between the west and the Soviet Union meant western nations had to change
their strategy regarding their relationship with Franco to ensure they did not ally
themselves within the communists.250 Spain sought to use the invite, not to win medals or
to show its strength, but to earn other countries’ respect through their athlete’s good
behavior and good sportsmanship.251 Spain had a poor national sporting program due to a
near decade at war and low investment in sports. The regime had enough athletes to
participate in just nine sporting events. Sporting success and medal count, however, were
a secondary thought for the regime and instead instructed their athletes that, “in London,
all eyes will be on Spain. Any unfortunate behavior would be used by the foreigners who
are hostile to our colors and any inadequate behavior from our athletes would be pleasing
to them.”252 The national sports delegate and coach of the Spanish National Team,
General Moscardó, was perhaps even more explicit in his directions for athletes in a
speech given just before athletes left for London:
Every Spanish sportsman must give his best performance and the best qualities of
our race, courage, enthusiasm and vigour, must shine in every moment. I expect
and demand that everyone, because they are Spaniards, will not only do his duty
but will also excel at it, if necessary. . . . They must behave properly, abiding the
rules of courtesy and displaying the traditional Spanish gentlemanliness. . . . They
249
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must abstain from making statements outside of sport. . . . No matter what the
results, but how honourable the victory is, since not winning is not a defeat in
sport, although this word has been rarely written in our language. 253
Spain performed abysmally, winning just one silver medal. However, they did leave a
very good impression. Spanish runners would stop and help up other runners who fell.
Their hockey team was not overly aggressive. They continuously praised the Brits for
their generosity and hospitality.
A similar opportunity presented itself with the 1950 World Cup in Brazil. FIFA
was tasked with organizing the qualifying groups to ensure that all nations would be
willing to play one another. Spain had to be placed in a group with Portugal and the Irish
Republic as they were the only two nations willing to play the fascists. General
Moscardo, once again, encouraged an ambassadorial approach from the players. Player
Luis Molowny described the instruction from the government official:
During the training camp at El Escorial before flying to Brazil, we were told
countless times that we should think of ourselves as ambassadors for Spain,
shunned by the rest of the world for daring to be different. We were instructed
about how to behave ourselves in Brazil, for example, always to wear an official
suit, to say the right thing to foreign Pressman, and even to pick your opponent up
off the floor with a smile if you had fouled him.254
The fourth place finish at the games, surprise win against footballing powerhouse
England, and impressive style of play portrayed an advancing and strong Spain, which
only continued to boost their international image. Spain’s improving reputation was
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evidenced by the election of RFEF President and former Blue Division doctor Armando
Munoz Calero to the executive committee of FIFA.255
The Spanish National Team would go on to perform poorly after the 1950 World
Cup, which meant they couldn’t be used as a diplomatic tool very often. However, there
were a few politically significant games, the most significant was against the Soviet
Union in 1964. In 1960, Spain was drawn against the Soviet Union in the quarterfinals of
the first European Nations’ Cup. Franco banned the team from playing what he
considered to be the communist enemy and forced them to withdraw from the
competition.256 Four year later, however, when Spain met the Soviet Union in the finals of
the tournament, with the game to be played in Madrid, Franco could not refuse. Both
teams, recognizing the political significance of the event, were lectured prior to the game
of the importance of maintaining good sportsmanship throughout the match. The Spanish
national team went on to beat the Soviet Union 2-1 in front of Franco, his ministers, and
125,000 fans at Real Madrid’s impressive Estadio Bernabeu.257 The game was also played
on television in fifteen European countries, so the Spanish regime could show off, "the
image of a happy and hospitable Spain, basking in the social peace established by our
good protector and Caudillo, Francisco Franco.”258 Unfortunately for the regime, the
ambassadorial significance of the Spanish national team was confined mainly to these
two achievements in Brazil and Madrid.
While the national team would seem like the natural sporting ambassador for a
country as the official team of a country, Spain’s national team lacked the winning ability
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to compete on high international platforms. Rather, it would be the private sports club
Real Madrid that would pave the way for international sporting integration for Spain.
Real Madrid first established itself as a politically significant team during Primo De
Rivera's reign. Los Blancos were the first Spanish team to face English teams on English
soil in 1925.259 Two years later, they toured North and South America over the course of
four months. While the tour had a sporting and financial purpose, there was also a clear
nationalist objective, with the director, Santiago Bernabéu, explicitly calling the tour
"Spanish propaganda."260 Though these international trips were not directly associated
with the regime, it did afford Real Madrid access to the most elite financial and political
circles in the nation’s capital.
Their political significance would continue to grow during the Francoist period.
After Franco came to power in 1939, the regime took control over the appointment of top
club officials and board members. The aforementioned director, Bernabéu, was appointed
to be the club president. Bernabéu had left his post as director to fight for Franco’s
Nationalist during the Civil War alongside the man who would become Franco’s deputy
prime minister.261 Raimundo Saporta, close friend of Real Madrid member and Franco’s
Foreign Minister Fernando Castiella, was selected to be Real Madrid’s vice president.
The rest of Los Blancos’ board was "armored'' with high profile military officials and
Nationalist politicians.262 Beyond the boardroom, Real Madrid was the favorite team of
many politically significant figures. Paying Real Madrid members, known as socios,
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included the Minister of Tourism Manuel Fraga Ibarne, the Secretary General of the
Falange José Solís, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gregorio López Bravo.263 The
president of city rival Atlético Madrid, Jesús Gil, famously complained that the “the
directors’ box at the Bernabéu is worse than the General’s hunting trips.” 264 In other
words, Real Madrid leadership was essentially a who's who of powerful men in Spanish
politics.
Real Madrid’s board of powerful directors, however, did not guarantee success on
the field. For the first decade of Franco’s reign, Los Blancos split the spotlight with FC
Barcelona, Athletic de Bilbao, and neighbor Atlético de Madrid. 265 It wasn’t until the
1952 signing of Argentine Alfredo Di Stefano that Real Madrid would become the
powerhouse team that Franco could use as a diplomatic tool. Alfredo Di Stefano, one of
the greatest players to ever grace the beautiful game (who was allegedly stolen away
from FC Barcelona and given to Real at the behest of the dictator), would lead Real
Madrid to not just domestic success, but also international domination.266
Real Madrid’s first international win in July 1952 at the prestigious Pequena Copa
del Mundo in Colombia earned the team a glowing report from the Spanish ambassador
in Bogota:
The behavior of the components of the Real Madrid party, from the first director
to the last player, has been irreproachable in every aspect, and the impression that
they have left behind, thanks to their impeccable correctness, sporting
gentlemanliness and patriotism, has been practically perfect.267
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A Latin Cup title followed in 1955 and the Franco regime awarded the entire Real
Madrid team with the Falangist Medal of the Imperial Order of the Yoke and Arrows, a
distinction not granted to FC Barcelona for their wins in the same tournament in 1949
and 1952. It was the five consecutive European Champions Clubs’ Cup wins between
1956-60 after Real Madrid took on a truly diplomatic role for the regime.268
The dictatorship capitalized on Real Madrid’s victories in the European Cup and,
from the mid-1950s onwards, Real Madrid became the unofficial ‘ambassador’ of Spain
abroad. Prior to any international travel, Real directors would inform the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of their commitments and would be sent valuable information and
instruction on how the team should act. In appreciation for Real Madrid’s cooperation
with the instructions and perhaps to ensure the positive outcome for the game, diplomats
would send reports on the opposition teams and players, information that was difficult to
collect at the time.269
Real Madrid’s early diplomatic role largely looked like a public relations tour to
put forth a positive and humane image of the dictatorship. During a South American tour
in 1958, for example, Real Vice President Saporta gave a check for a thousand US dollars
to the Argentine President to aid flood victims. In 1961, the Real players distributed
Spanish oranges at a Manchester children's hospital before a friendly match against
Manchester United. For all international games, the team would carry out both the
Spanish flag and the flag of the host country out onto the field.270
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As Madrid’s role of ambassador developed, Franco's Foreign Minister Castiella
would send his close friend Saporta specific diplomatic objectives for their international
trips. For example, just nine months before Spain first tried to enter the European
Economic Community, Castiella requested that Real Madrid go to the Council of Europe
in Strasbourg while they were there for a match.271 Saporta gave a speech in which he
proclaimed that “it is an honor to have been called to play in the ‘European Capital’,
because this demonstrates that even this Council, where Spain is not at the moment
represented, consider us as Europeans.” 272
Real Madrid’s sixth European Cup win in 1966 held perhaps the most significance
of any of the wins. Following the retirement of Di Stefano, the ‘66 team was comprised
of only Spanish players which translated into strong nationalist sentiment and the feeling
of Spanish footballing dominance. The Spanish ambassador to Brussels wrote of the win:
“I wore Madrid’s badge with pride and happiness because, as a representative of my
Patria [Fatherland], I consider the presence of the Merengues in cities across the world to
be a genuine expression of our reborn, virile Spain, young and enthusiastic.”273
Furthermore, the final game was again, Partizan Belgrade. Partizan Balgrade was
effectively the Slavik army team, and were the first team from the eastern bloc to make
the final. Therefore, Real Madrid’s defeat of the side symbolized not just a Spanish
victory, but a Western bloc victory.274
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The regime also used Real Madrid to cultivate relationships with countries that
were identified as potential allies and trade partners for the regime. Throughout the ‘60s,
Castiella encouraged Real Madrid to play friendly matches against teams in Egypt and
Syria.275 Similarly, Real Madrid would take a trip to the United States where they would
play three exhibition matches in New York, Philadelphia and Washington DC in front of
three members of Eisenhower's cabinet. While it is unclear if Real Madrid was the direct
cause, Eisenhower did change his plans to spend time in Madrid after this American tour.
Real Madrid’s basketball team would also sign a number of American basketball stars,
further tying the two nations together.276

Conclusion
For Italy and Germany, international sports provided an opportunity to mask the
true nature of their totalitarian regimes and assert their dominance in not just sporting
competitions, but also in the power and success of their fascist regimes. Germany’s 1936
Olympics, specifically, has proven to be an infamously effective piece of state
propaganda, and influenced Olympic host city selections for decades after. Spain, on the
other hand, used sports primarily to to rebuild relationships with other countries and
overcome the shame and dishonor of having been so closely tied to the Axis powers.
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V.

Conclusion

In my thesis, I have identified three major goals that the totalitarian regimes of
Germany, Italy, and Spain sought to accomplish through the utilization and manipulation
of sports: improving their nation’s health and fitness for military preparation, constructing
a national identity, and as a diplomatic tool to improve their international reputation.
Following the destruction and humiliation of World War I and the political and
economic instability of the interwar period, all three regimes promised to revive the
citizenry to their historical, imperial standards. They sought to reclaim land they believed
to be historically their own and to achieve the status of a great colonial power through
territorial expansion. These promises required improvement in the overall health and
fitness of society and the growth and advancement of their military forces. All three
regimes engaged in the “sportification” of their societies, which involved the creation and
implementation of some of the world’s first national physical education programs, a
requirement for the participation in sports for all, and the introduction of state-sponsored
youth organizations.
The three regimes relied heavily on the support of the masses to legitimize their
rule and overlook the government’s failures. Since regimes could not gain support
through economic success or majority vote, they sought to create a political culture that
fostered ultra-nationalist sentiment and, in turn, reinforced the regime. Sports had become
an incredibly popular cultural institution, and became a venue for banal nationalism and a
distraction from any failures of the government.
Sports also provided a space where the totalitarian regimes could improve their
international reputation and mask the true nature of their regimes. Hosting and
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participating in international sporting events, the most significant of which were the 1934
Italian World Cup and the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, allowed regimes to portray
themselves as welcoming, cosmopolitan countries, rather than deeply racist and
nationalist regimes that oppressed anyone believed to be the “enemy” of the state.
Athletes and spectators that traveled internationally acted as ambassadors for the state
and pushed the political agenda of the regimes.
This thesis contributes and compiles valuable and under-studied information
regarding the manipulation of sport by three Western European totalitarian regimes for
the achievement of state goals. Analyzing the strategies and policies of these regimes
allows us to better understand the oppressive, racist, and destructive mechanisms of the
state from a cultural perspective that has often been left out of traditional social and
cultural international studies. This study allows us to consider how modern totalitarian
regimes, or any regime with totalitarian features, may be similarly using sports as a
means of achieving their own goals.
The manipulation of sports for political purposes by totalitarian regimes has
inspired governments of all types to do the same ever since. The commercialization and
privatization of clubs and teams, coupled with the ever-growing popularization and
amplification of sports in all forms of media, has brought the pastime to the forefront of
society. The lack of understanding and awareness of sports' relationship to politics raise
significant concerns regarding the ethics surrounding the industry in all contexts, but
most noticeably at the elite, international level. Russia’s hosting of the 2018 World Cup
prompted important questions about the safeguarding of sport from malicious and violent
regimes. Russia's subsequent invasion of Ukraine seems to directly confirm that the
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international and open country that was on display during the Cup four years ago was far
from a true depiction of Russia and their government.277 Similar concerns mar this year’s
World Cup in Qatar, where 6,500 migrant workers have died during Qatar’s preparation
for the event and questions still linger about whether or not the nation will accept
LGBTQ fans.278
Amidst all the manipulation and exploitation, however, the politicization of sport
can also help bring light to a very dark world. And there is a team that personifies that
light more so than most others. The city of Kiev plays an important role in both the
fascist era and the modern era. Between the Nazis and current Russian forces, Kiev has
had to face devasting attacks from two dictatorships. But despite the 80 years between the
events, FC Dynamo Kiev has remained resilient in the face of oppression. Kiev fell to
Nazi forces in Septermber 1941 and began a nightmarish existence under Nazi
occupation.279 One consolation for the residents of Kiev, however, was their celebrated
football club. Though the team lost a number of players in German blitzkrieg, the squad
was reformed as Start FC in the Nazi league that was used for political pacification as
described in Chapter Four. They dominated the league, racking up impressive victories
over Nazi teams. The team took on an overtly political dimension, one of rebellion and
resistance against their totalitarian occupiers. Tragically, within a week of a dominant
performance of the Nazi Luftwaffe team Flakelf, all of the members of Start FC were
arrested and sent to concentration camps.280 The legend of the Dynamo players and the
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story of the ‘death match’ was a source of inspiration for the millions of Ukrainians
during and after the war, and a statue honoring Start FC stands outside Dynamo Kiev’s
stadium today.281
Over 80 years after the beginning of Nazi occupation, Ukraine faces attack from
another oppressive regime, this time from the east. Russia’s assault on the country,
however, has inspired Dynamo Kiev to reclaim their role as a symbol of joy and pride for
their nation. The team relocated to Bucharest, Romania when the war began and have
started training.282 Though the Ukrainian league has been halted indefinitely, Dynamo
plans to travel to Europe’s biggest stadiums to play the world’s most prolific teams, such
as AC Milan, FC Barcelona, Paris Saint Germain, and Borussia Dortmund, and raise
money for Ukraine. The purpose of the tour was best summarized by Dynamo coach
Mircea Lucescu:
This is not about football, football is just our vehicle. An invitation to play is a
sign for those who are in Ukraine, for those fighting or suffering, for those who
need to hide because of the shelling. It's not just a game [...] We must not forget.
We must not go back to our daily routine and forget about Ukraine. These games
come to honor the victims and to give hope and comfort to all in Ukraine. 283
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